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Anti-competitive behaviour in a market is associated with related effects that may not always be 
captured in traditional approaches to locating damages.  Conventionally, to determine when anti-
competitive behaviour have started, prevailed, and ended, analysts rely on the formal documentary 
evidence presented in the case. However, the associated effects may have lasted before and/or after 
the formally established liability date. Such effects are central to proper damage estimation and may 
even have an impact on establishing the existence of conduct in the first place. With the focus on 
excessive pricing, this study firstly analyses the various benchmarks used locally and abroad to 
determine excessive pricing and finds that such benchmarking is done non-econometrically despite 
the need to properly control for demand and supply factors. This study then applies what is known 
from collusion literature to the dating of excessive pricing. Collusion literature shows that there is a 
problem with pre- and post-effects, and it is often necessary to differentiate between formal and 
effective dates. Furthermore, this study examines current policy approaches to determining anti-
competitive dates and finds that precise dating is less important in pre-Covid-19 cases. However, 
there is a problem with dating Covid-19 excessive pricing cases because of the relevant regulations 
specifying the fixed 3-month comparative period. Econometric methods are particularly important 
in this regard and will be for excessive pricing cases to come. This study supplemented the traditional 
counterfactual methodology with a structural break test and a Markov switching-regime test to 
properly determine the effective dates of the case at hand. The application is to the Foskor excessive 
pricing case. This quantitative approach shows that, although the actual effect may precede or follow 
after the formal identified dates, wrongly specifying the relevant periods leads to a significant 






Teenmededingende gedrag in 'n mark hou verband met effekte wat nie altyd vasgevang kan word in 
die tradisionele benadering tot die opsporing van skadevergoeding nie. Om vas te stel wanneer 
teenmededingende gedrag ’n aanvang geneem het, voortgeduur het en beëindig is, word gewoonlik 
van die formele dokumentêre getuienis, wat in die saak na vore tree, gebruik gemaak. Die 
gepaardgaande effekte kan egter voor en/of na die formele vasgestelde aanspreeklikheidsdatum 
voorkom. Sulke effekte is egter noodsaaklik in die korrekte beraming van skade en kan selfs 'n invloed 
hê op die bepaling van die teenmededingende gedrag in die eerste plek. Met die fokus op buitensporige 
prysbepaling, ontleed hierdie studie eerstens die verskillende maatstawwe wat plaaslik en in die 
buiteland gebruik word om buitensporige pryse vas te stel, en bevind dat sulke maatstawwe 
hoofsaaklik nie-ekonometries van aard is, ondanks die behoefte om vraag- en aanbodfaktore in ag te 
neem. Hierdie studie maak dus op die samespanningsliteratuur staat om die ekonometriese datering 
van buitensporige pryse te bestudeer. Die samespanningsliteratuur toon dat daar 'n probleem is met 
voor- en na-effekte, en dat dit dikwels nodig is om te onderskei tussen formele en effektiewe datums. 
Verder ondersoek hierdie studie huidige beleidsbenaderings tot die bepaling van mededingingsdatums 
en vind dat presiese datering minder belangrik is in sake voor Covid-19. Daar is egter 'n probleem met 
die datering van sake rondom buitensporige pryse wat met die Covid-19-pandemie verband hou, 
aangesien die tersaaklike regulasies ’n vaste vergelykingsperiode van drie maande spesifiseer. 
Ekonometriese metodes is veral belangrik in hierdie verband en vir toekomstige buitensporige 
prysgevalle. Hierdie studie het die tradisionele kontra-feitelike metodologie met 'n strukturele-breek-
toets en 'n Markov-omskakelingstoets aangevul om die effektiewe datums van die betrokke saak te 
bepaal. Dit is toegepas op die Foskor-saak vir buitensporige pryse. Hierdie kwantitatiewe benadering 
toon dat, aangesien die werklike effek die formeel geïdentifiseerde datums vooraf kan gaan of kan 
volg, die verkeerde effektiewe tydperk tot 'n aansienlike onderskatting van die relevante 
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1. Introduction  
 
Anti-competitive behaviour in a market is usually associated with related effects that may not always 
be captured in traditional approaches to locating damages. Following the European position, South 
Africa deems anti-competitive conduct to have started, prevailed, and ended based on the formal 
documentary evidence at hand (Boswijk et al., 2019:26).  However, the associated effects may have 
lasted before or even long after the formally established liability date. Such effects are central to 
proper damage estimation and may even have an impact on establishing the existence of conduct 
such as excessive pricing in the first place. 
 
Thus, establishing the appropriate dates or periods when such anti-competitive effects were truly 
being felt in the market is an important and often neglected issue in competition cases.1 The use of 
different econometric techniques may assist in identifying case-specific effects in the market. The 
quantitative approach to this task shows that although the actual effect may precede or follow after 
the formal identified dates, wrongly specifying the relevant periods leads to a significant 
underestimation of the damages in the case at hand. 
 
This paper focusses on excessive pricing. Section 2 analyses the various benchmarks used locally and 
abroad to determine excessive pricing and the conditions in which the most recent investigative 
developments (intertemporal benchmarking) are preferable: which are where there is a comparable 
competitive period and a structural break that delineates a competitive from a non-competitive period 
(Boshoff, 2020:6). It finds that such benchmarking is done non-econometrically despite the need to 
properly control for demand and supply factors. There has recently been an emphasis in collusion 
literature on dating. The literature shows that there is a problem with pre- and post-effects, and it is 
often necessary to differentiate between formal and effective dates. Applying what is known from 
collusion literature, this paper focusses on the dating of excessive pricing. Section 3 of this paper 
examines current policy approaches to determining anti-competitive dates, cases of abuse other than 
 
1 In this study, different areas of anti-competitive conduct such as the abuse of dominance and collusion are used 
interchangeably to a certain extent. This is because the main objective is to use econometrics to capture any anti-
competitive structural change irrespective of the specification of the anti-competitive behaviour. Also, many overlapping 
principles will be addressed, but the commonality here lies in the fact that there is a change which needs to be captured in 
the econometric method, irrespective of what anti-competitive behaviour drove the change. For example, guides on 
quantifying damages make it clear that “the harm caused by excessive pricing is similar to that caused by cartels: a firm 






excessive pricing, and cases of excessive pricing, and finds that precise dating is less important in 
previous pre-Covid-19 cases, but there is a problem with dating Covid-19 excessive pricing cases 
because of the new regulation specifying the fixed 3-month comparative period. Econometric methods 
are particularly important in this regard and will be for excessive pricing cases to come. Section 4 
describes the methodologies used and section 5 shows their application to the Foskor excessive pricing 
case. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
To understand the dating of anti-competitive effects with application to excessive pricing, this 
section first explains how to determine excessive pricing by analysing the possible benchmarks in 
South African and international competition law to which the investigated price may be compared.  
It also identifies relevant conditions in which retrospective or so-called intertemporal benchmarks 
are preferable, as suggested by recent developments. Secondly, this section addresses the reasons 
why the intertemporal benchmarking method is traditionally followed in South African cases without 
considering econometric methods, and then explains why there is a need to consider such 
econometric methods when dealing with the dating of such cases. Thirdly, this section discusses the 
recent emphasis in intertemporal benchmarking in collusion on dating with regard to the problem of 
pre- and post- effects, thereby creating different formal and effective dates, which is also applicable 
to cases of excessive pricing. The section concludes by showing how dating is important in cases of 
excessive pricing both with regard to the calculation of damages and for the purposes of detecting 
such conduct. 
 
2.1 Determining excessive pricing 
 
In comparison with international practice, South Africa has been very active in mitigating the “risks 
of, and prosecuting, excessive pricing” during Covid-19 (Boshoff, 2020:2). The international 
approach to addressing pricing issues in this time of crisis seems to rely mainly on competition policy 
(Boshoff, 2020:19). It should be noted at this stage that not all other jurisdictions prohibit exploitative 
abuses. The United States anti-trust policy, for instance, reasons that the US does not prosecute 
dominant firms charging higher prices because they do not want to deter innovation (Boshoff, 




is in fact prohibited (Boshoff, 2020:2). According to Gilo (2018) international practice in this regard 
features comparative benchmarking and cost-based benchmarking to obtain a more competitive 
benchmark for use in establishing excessive pricing. Generally, international practice seems to tend 
towards the use of intertemporal benchmarks (embedded in comparative benchmarking) as being 
preferable to other benchmarking systems as the data for drawing such comparisons seems to be 
more easily accessible and it limits the need for complicated cost and profit calculations (Boshoff, 
2020:19). 
 
South African competition law, prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, in a sense gave limited guidance on 
determining excessive pricing. Section 8(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (Republic of South 
Africa, 1998) “prohibits a dominant firm” from charging a so-called excessive price to consumers 
where an excessive price is defined as a higher price “that bears no reasonable relation to the 
economic value of that good or service.” The essential problem with this concept is that the 
authorities will usually have to consider what constitute the economic value in question, without 
having a definition or measurement of it, and then determine what price is reasonable in relation to 
this economic value (Theron, 2019). To determine whether a price is excessive or not, it must be 
compared with some price benchmark (Gilo & Spiegel, 2018). The complexity of determining an 
appropriate benchmark to identify malpractice is clear. In fact, this definition of economic value has 
been abandoned and has been replaced in section 1(b) of Act 18 of 2018 by a set of factors to be 
taken into consideration in such matters. 2  From an economics perspective these factors are quite 
“close to the factors” that the authorities are already considering when determining economic value, 
and it is thus uncertain what the explicit listing of them really contributes to the issue. In other words, 
listing them does not resolve the complexity of obtaining a “competitive benchmark price” (Boshoff, 
2020:4). One factor that may be emphasised in the context of this study (in Section 8(3)(d)) is the 
“length of time the prices have been charged” at that excessive pricing level. In the CC v Dis-Chem 
Pharmacies (CR008Apr20) excessive pricing case, it is stated that the deliberate removal of the 
concept of economic value in the Act poses an “intention to exclude” it completely, and instead one 
is required to look at a “competitive price” to detect whether a price is excessive. It is important to 
emphasise a well-known economic fact early on in this study: a competitive price is a price 
determined by supply and demand. Up until the end of 2019, excessive pricing had been proved in 
 
2 According to section 3 of the Act, these factors may include: “the respondent’s price-cost margin, internal rate of return, 
return on capital invested or profit history; the respondent’s prices for the goods or services; relevant comparator firm’s 
prices and level of profits for the goods or services in a competitive market for those goods or services; the length of time 
the prices have been charged at that level; the structural characteristics of the relevant market; and any regulations made 




no South African cases (all such cases having been settled) due to the different possible 
interpretations of what constitutes excessive pricing (Theron, 2019). Thus, the challenge with 
excessive pricing is clear: one needs to determine an appropriate competitive benchmark price to 
compare with the price in question (Boshoff, 2020:5). This is not a simple task, and its complexity 
is probably the reason why excessive pricing cases before the national disaster, both internationally 
and locally were limited to very specific settings: usually state-supported, high-end, and large 
corporations (Boshoff, 2020:1).  
 
However, after the declaration of a national state of disaster by the President of South Africa in 
March 2020, new regulations regarding excessive pricing on certain products and services were 
published.3 Although these regulations are valid only for the period of the proclaimed disaster, they 
suggest a benchmark for use in judging the setting of excessive prices (Boshoff, 2020:1). 
Specifically, section 4 of the said regulations had a significant influence on the judging of two 
instances when a price was prima facie excessive: first, a price increase that did not correspond to 
the “increase in the cost” of providing that product, and secondly, a price increase which resulted in 
bigger profit margins than in the three month period before the disaster was proclaimed (up to 1 
March 2020).4 This comparison constitutes the so-called intertemporal benchmark (comparisons 
drawn across different time periods), is in accordance with the international practice, and may lessen 
the complexity of finding an appropriate competitive benchmark (Boshoff, 2020:19). Analysing 
specific factors in a firm under investigation and comparing them with the same factors in the same 
firm in the pre-disaster period eliminates the need to scrutinise other factors that are difficult to 
measure, as discussed later. Therefore, the most recent suggested benchmark is the same market (as 
that which is under investigation) in an earlier time period, when there are enough available data for 
the earlier period (Boshoff, 2020:6). The period before the disaster is assumed to be the period used 
for the purposes of comparison, because the firm had not then had the opportunity, in the absence of 
the unique circumstances of Covid-19, to abuse its dominance by charging an excessive price. In the 
CC v Dis-Chem Pharmacies case, well known competition economist Massimo Motta supported the 
 
3 Despite the publication of block exemptions for various sectors, and the more procedural tribunal rules for complaint 
referrals, the regulations which are of importance here are the Consumer and Customer Protection and National Disaster 
Management Regulations and Directions (GNR.350 of 19 March 2020) hereafter referred to as the regulations. The 
Minister of Trade and Industry has also published regulations in terms of the South African Consumer Protection Act 68 
of 2000, in terms of “unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable and unjust” pricing, but this as well, is not the focal point of 
this study. 
4 These regulations apply to goods and services broadly listed in Annexure A: “Basic food and consumer items; emergency 




use of the pre-disaster period as the competitive period, because according to him, the demand and 
supply conditions during that time were “presumably normal”.  
 
It is also important to note that with these new regulations a shift of focus is made in terms of 
conventional views of market power, as more smaller players are now also involved in excessive 
pricing cases. Boshoff (2020:3) explains that smaller players may gain temporal market power due 
to the abnormal circumstances of a crisis like Covid-19, for example, if the disaster generates a 
change in the behaviour of customers or fewer firms can operate fully, limiting the choice available 
to consumers. Such market power will influence the possibility of intervention (Boshoff, 2020:1). 
Conventional policy, both local and abroad, was more likely to consider market power in the long 
run and the ability to sustain it (Boshoff, 2020:3). However, recent South African cases have 
focussed on shorter time periods, which shows that policy is now more concerned with price 
increases in the short run (Boshoff, 2020:3). Even though there are contrasting views about market 
power and specifically this new temporal market power, this study will assume that a firm in question 
does have some form of market power, as the focus is on determining the excessive pricing that 
follows the exercise of such power.  
 
The fact of the matter is that even with the change in the conventional approaches arising from the 
new regulations, determining excessive pricing is still a complex matter and care should be exercised 
in finding an appropriate competitive benchmark. The type of benchmark chosen depends on the 
circumstances at hand. The intertemporal benchmark is the option favoured in Covid-19-related 
investigations, but there are also other possible benchmarks that could be of use in detecting 
excessive pricing. In earlier South Africa cases, such as the Mittal and Sasol cases, the authorities 
preferred to reference a bottom-up, cost-based benchmark, and rightfully so, as it was more 
appropriate to the circumstances of those cases. They lasted for many years (excessive pricing has 
been an issue for a long time) with no clear break between a competition- and anti-competition period 
and an intertemporal benchmark would therefore not have been an appropriate fit (Boshoff, 2020:7).5 
A cost-based approach involves determining the “average cost” for the product or service under 
investigation and then identifying a reasonable profit margin (Boshoff, 2020:5). Such an approach 
clearly has its own challenges, such as determining what profit margin would apply in a more 
 
5 What happened in many earlier collusion cases is that a certain period was chosen to do a before-during-and-after 
analysis, but it reflected no changes in the periods, as the firms kept their high built-in premiums throughout all the periods, 





competitive market, or translating “accounting costs” into “economic costs”, and would normally be 
preferred only when a comparable market or firm is not available (Boshoff, 2020:5). International 
authorities are hesitant to use a cost-based approach and tend to use comparator benchmarking. This 
involves the use of a competitive benchmark where the investigated price is compared with the price 
charged contemporaneously in another similar market by the same firm or by similar firms (Gilo & 
Spiegel, 2018:1). For example, one might compare a dominant firm’s local prices with its export 
prices to establish whether the price charged on the local market is too high. This is called the spatial 
approach in cartel literature, and it will be used in the Foskor case study presented later in this paper. 
The challenge with this approach, however, is to account for all the idiosyncratic errors across 
different markets, for example. Akman and Garrod (2011) recognise that some features in terms of 
demand, supply and the structure in different markets meant for comparison, may be unobservable. 
That is why it is easier to look at the prices set by the same firm in different time periods as there are 
fewer incommensurable variables to take into consideration (Gilo, 2018). Nevertheless, the 
intertemporal benchmark is nested within the comparator benchmark set, and this set is the dominant 
set used at present. 
 
The intertemporal benchmark approach is likely to be successful under only two conditions. Firstly, 
it is vital that there must be an exogenous structural break or shift that delineates a competitive from 
a non-competitive period (Boshoff, 2020:6).6 A structural shift may come in different forms: it could 
be a factor causing  more or fewer competitors to enter the market, which would change the 
competitive conditions but not the demand and costs, so that the increase in price could be directly 
linked to the change in competitive conditions; it could be a change in the regulative environment,  
as when a regulated price period is seen as the competitive period and deregulation is seen as the 
shift; or it could simply be a change in consumer behaviour (the consumers might become more 
sensitive to prices, for example) (Gilo, 2018). It is important, however, that such shifts should be 
significantly linked to the relevant changes in competitive conditions (Boshoff, 2020:7). For 
instance, the national disaster has resulted in a situation where there was a more competitive period 
before the disaster than after, which has allowed for price changes related to the changes in the 
conditions of competition (Boshoff, 2020:7). One might have to support and verify the impression 
that there have indeed been changes in the competition conditions in any particular case, by assessing 
market power for example, but Covid-19-related cases are nevertheless very useful for fixing an 
 
6 The necessity of an exogenous structural shift is well illustrated in cartel damage calculation, where it is used in the 




intertemporal benchmark. This is so because the starting date of the proclamation of the disaster 
presents a clear structural break in the conditions of competition. For example, consumers were 
limited to stores that could stay open at critical times, or might have been prepared to pay more for 
a product to limit their exposure to an open environment. With this clear shift or break – when one 
can assume demand and cost conditions were similar across the period (which is the crux of the 
matter, and the second condition in the next paragraph) – one may then attribute any rise in prices to 
the change in the conditions of competition, showing that excessive pricing is taking place.  
 
Secondly, Boshoff (2020:7) explains that there also needs to be a comparable competitive period. 
This means that the cost and demand conditions in the different periods must be similar, so that the 
competitive effects may be isolated (Akman & Garrod, 2011). One must be aware of the different 
possible demand and cost shocks (one must account for such different conditions) that may exist 
throughout the different periods. Put differently, obtaining a comparable benchmark that reflects a 
more competitive stance requires conditioning for both cost and demand side factors in the different 
periods (Gilo, 2018). Accounting for cost and demand is in line with international practice. As noted 
previously, a competitive price is one determined by both supply and demand. The regulations allow 
for conditional comparisons on cost increases but do not clarify how changing demand conditions 
will be treated. Basically, changes – increases - in demand will have their effect in the profit margin 
(making it significantly larger) which is prohibited through excessive pricing. This indicates that 
authorities do not want firms to respond to demand in such disaster periods. In considering profit 
margins, one would still consider unchanged demand, but essentially firms are prohibited to respond 
to the surge in demand created by Covid-19. This is a strong position to take, and not allowing for 
responses to changing demand may be devastating to the market, especially if it results in shortages 
in supply, as it may disincentivise increasing supply to respond to demand. Boshoff (2020:10) makes 
it clear that if such regulations treat demand-based price increases as if they are necessarily anti-
competitive, this will undermine the consistency of intertemporal benchmarking, and it is unclear 
why price-demand relationships are not accounted for. The regulations seem to be creating a stricter 
test or benchmark than general excessive pricing approaches to compare prices against. The 
regulations are acting in a price-gouging way by not controlling for demand, and although it is much 
easier for the authorities to apply such a benchmark, it may not be appropriate. Even in very 
competitive markets, prices can rise significantly in response to cost or demand surges, and this is 





Boshoff (2020:11) ran simulations to determine when the regulations’ benchmark might work. Note 
that when a sustained price increase in a specific case is very high, for example a 300% mark-up, it 
will exceed both the general excessive pricing benchmark and the regulations’ stricter benchmark. 
Thus, in such cases it would not be difficult to identify excessive pricing. However, Boshoff 
(2020:11) notes that cases between these benchmarks will pose much more difficulties. He finds that 
the regulations’ stricter benchmark will not be consistent with normal excessive pricing 
intertemporal benchmarks if the higher demand is sustained rather and not a mere spike (Boshoff, 
2020:16). Section 2.2 of this paper will show that when dealing with smaller firms, one is mostly 
concerned with a spike in demand, probably due to the firms facing uncertainties. This is not serious 
in terms of excessive pricing, and the stricter benchmark may as well be used. However, with larger 
firms with a more established position in the market one may be faced with elevated demand which 
calls for a proper consideration of the price-cost and price–demand relationships. The next section 
of this paper will study the related excessive pricing cases to get more clarity on how the regulations 
are applied. There is no doubt that the intertemporal benchmark approach has the potential to 
overcome the challenges of accounting for demand changes between the periods. It also prohibits 
the “full exploitation of willingness-to-pay” in line with the act’s objectives by not allowing for 
sources of market power like price increases due to structural shifts in demand (Boshoff, 
2020:10).However, these advantages will only occur if the benchmark is applied properly. 
 
Determining excessive pricing is without a doubt a challenge, and an appropriate case-to-case, 
benchmark with which to compare the price under investigation against is unavoidable. Various 
benchmarks have been developed locally and abroad, including the cost-based and comparative 
benchmarks as already discussed. Most recent developments, especially with regard to Covid-19-
related investigations, prefer an intertemporal benchmark in assessing excessive pricing, which 
requires the presence of a comparable competitive period and a structural break that delineates a 
competitive from a non-competitive period (Boshoff, 2020:19). Whether this preference will give 
rise to a permanent change in competition law will depend on case-by-case developments and it is 
yet to be discovered how the situation will play out after the Covid-19 disaster period. The important 
thing is that even though the intertemporal benchmark is the most appropriate benchmark to use, 
caution must be exercised when applying this system in its strictest form to cases with slight price 







2.2 Intertemporal benchmarking in South African cases 
 
Intertemporal benchmarking is in fact not traditionally the preferred method in South African cases 
dealing with excessive pricing, but Covid-19 has made it so. There have been various new excessive 
pricing cases in South Africa since the new regulations were published. This section of the paper 
will analyse how intertemporal benchmarking is performed in South Africa, based on these cases.  
 
The more recent excessive pricing cases are against firms (smaller pharmacies in narrow geographic 
markets and some bigger retailers like Dis-Chem) selling facial masks, sanitisers, and other Covid-
19-related products. In most of these cases – those where the product was not being sold for the first 
time - the intertemporal benchmark was indeed used. In studying the cases against the smaller firms, 
Boshoff (2020:7) found the following: 
price responses to demand and cost were relatively quick in these cases, implying a shorter interval for 
dynamic price adjustment. In addition, it would have been relatively clear in these cases that the demand 
spike had subsided after a few weeks. Consequently, these cases involve a reasonably straightforward 
judgment of whether price continued to exceed the higher level justified by the initial demand spike 
and, hence, whether the price is excessive. 
Thus, the benchmark applied by the authorities by looking at costs and profit margins was 
appropriate against these firms, which were facing a demand spike. Table 1 shows some of these 
recent cases at the time of writing, but the list could be extended in similar fashion, with new cases 
of this type coming up until early March. As suggested by the regulations, the authorities mostly 
have considered a comparator consisting of the price or profit margin in an earlier period, and in 
some cases the cost implications. The current methods applied may be appropriate when there is 
merely a once-off spike in demand, but it is important to note that cases facing consistently higher 
demand will not yield standard averages if one accounts only for cost drivers (Boshoff, 2020:19).  
Then it would be more appropriate to apply the conventional excessive demand approach used in 
South Africa before these recent developments took place (Boshoff, 2020:11). Boshoff (2020:11) 
also emphasises the importance of understanding the elasticity of price, especially regarding elevated 
demand, and what competitive reaction may be expected. Only two such cases have been contested 
so far: CC v Babelegi Workwear (CR003Apr20) and CC v Dis-Chem Pharmacies (CR008Apr20), 
which shed some light on excessive pricing issues.7 CC v Babelegi Workwear (CR003Apr20) will be 
analysed in depth in section 3.3 of this paper. In CC v Dis-Chem Pharmacies, the same stricter 
benchmark was used, which may be contestable, as Dis-Chem, a larger, well-established firm, is very 
 
7 It is important to emphasise that these cases were dealt with under the existing competition legislation (as opposed to 




likely to be faced with elevated demand, especially when considering reasonableness. In such cases 
the analysis is much more complicated than simply considering costs and constant profit margins. 
Persistent higher demand must in fact be reflected in the competitive prices. No econometric models 
were used in any of these cases for example to analyse the demand involved. From the discussion in 
section 2.1 it is clear that there is a need for such models, especially in in-between cases with 
sustained demand, as the current “silver-bullet” way of estimating whether or not a price is excessive 
does not account for demand-side factors and may result in over- and under-enforcement errors. 
 
The reasons why the Tribunal is not using an econometric method for detecting excessive pricing 
cases may include practical considerations, especially regarding the short time intervals over which 
these new cases persist (Boshoff, 2020:11). Considering only applicable cost changes and profit 
margins is understandably much easier to prosecute, and as seen above, may be appropriate in some 
cases. 
 
Table 1: Covid-19 excessive pricing (source: https://www.comptrib.co.za/cases-current) 
Order date Excessive pricing 
case 
How did the tribunal identify excessive pricing 
2020-07-08 CC v Mica Barberton Non-econometrically. The price of facial masks in 
the disaster period was compared to what it had 
been before 1 March 2020. The CC found a 711% 
mark-up and that it constituted a contravention of 
the Act. 
2020-07-08 CC v  Green Hygiene Non-econometrically. Green hygiene sold sanitizer 
dispensers at a 45,8% mark-up during the disaster 
period, which constituted a contravention of the 
Act. 
2020-07-08 CC v Eldoram 
Dienste CC t/a 
Eldopark Pharmacy 
Non-econometrically. Prior to the disaster, there 
was a 39% mark-up on facial masks; after March, a 
54% mark-up. They also started selling new 
products in this regard. The commission 
investigated the costs of such products and 
calculated the mark-ups, which they found to be 
“unreasonably high”. 
2020-07-07 CC v Dis-Chem 
Pharmacies 
Non-econometrically. The CC compared the prices 
of masks before and within the disaster period and 
considered the cost increase in relation to the price 
increase and noted that the latter occurred first, 
which meant that the demand drivers had not been 
considered (Boshoff, 2020:18). Awaiting appeal at 





2.3 Intertemporal benchmarking in collusion on dating 
 
Section 2.1 of this paper discussed the intertemporal condition of a structural break. There has been 
recent emphasis on this in addressing collusion on dating. Collusion models also compare prices 
during the existence of a cartel with prices prior to or after the cartel (a more competitive period) to 
estimate the price overcharges which form the basis of calculating damages (Boshoff, 2020:6). The 
same challenge is faced in cases of excessive pricing: to determine the overcharge, which is simply 
the excessive amount charged over and above a competitive price (Boshoff, 2020:11). Therefore, the 
literature on collusion offers an econometric methodology for arriving at benchmark price by using 
a reduced-form regression (Boshoff, 2020:11). 
 
As explained in the previous section, it is necessary to apply an econometric analysis when dealing 
with some excessive pricing cases in order to assess “the dynamic relationships between cost, 
demand and price” (Boshoff, 2020:11). Dynamic econometric models can capture the possible effects 
of the relations between price, cost drivers and demand drivers. The challenge identified in the cartel 
damage literature is that the relevant cartel period (identified via formal qualitative methods) is not 
necessarily the same as the relative effective period8. Competition authorities identify the period of 
collusion with seeming precision based on documentary evidence of communication, the so-called 
formal dates, but these dates are in effect rarely as straightforward as they seem to be when they are 
conventionally dealt with (Boswijk et al., 2019:26). The starting point of the period of liability 
identified by authorities is the date that may be listed on such records as “notes from diaries, records 
of meetings, emails referring to meetings or exchange of information, and memos describing pricing 
schemes” initiating the anti-competitive incentive (Davis and Garcés, 2010:376). The formal end of 
the liability period is assumed to be when the suspected firm is raided, together with the evidence of 
“notifications, guilty pleas and consent agreements” (Boswijk et al., 2019:26). Thus, the 
conventional position is as follows:  
…whenever there is consensus and the parties agree, in any form, on anti-competitive behaviour, or if 
it entails abuse of dominance (only one firm) – whenever that firm agrees on anti-competitive 
incentives, then that date up until the date when the party is raided, is taken as the official period of the 
anti-competitive effect (Bredenkamp, 2019:3). 
In contrast, the effective date is not normally found on formal documentation, but is instead when 
the effect of the conduct occurs in the market. It is understandable that one would tend to accept 
 
8  Boswijk, Bun, and Schinkel (2019) show the difference between the liability and formal periods empirically in the 





formal evidence as the period indicators at first sight, due to its simplicity and uncontroversial appeal 
(Davis and Garcés, 2010:376). Thus, in some instances, especially with smaller and less complex 
firms, the formal evidence may prove to be the appropriate period at hand, but it is more often the 
case that anti-competitive conduct has an effect in the market that lingers or lags over periods 
different from those noted in formal evidence. The concept of lingering effects has drawn some 
attention in the literature. It simply refers to when anti-competitive effects last beyond the initial end 
point, or drag on as opposed to having an immediate end. Boswijk et al. (2019:26) go so far as to say 
that there is no economic reason why the formal dates should reflect the collusive effective dates. 
When the legal liability period does not coincide with the period of effect, this may relate to: “the 
nature of the conspiracy or industry” (Boswijk et al., 2019:26); the size of the firm under 
investigation (large firms with more branches and various different agreements with agents might 
take longer to adjust prices than smaller firms) (Bredenkamp, 2019:4) ; the nature of the anti-
competitive agreement (Boswijk et al., 2019:26); the lags involved in raising prices and menu costs; 
possible future developments such as “planned price rises, the steady dismantling of capacity, or the 
postponement of innovation” (Boswijk et al., 2019:26); anti-competitive behaviour like cartels 
which normally form gradually (members join sequentially) (Boswijk et al., 2019:26); cartel firms 
withholding the anti-competitive actions after the initial cartel agreement meeting to circumvent 
getting caught, or firms stopping communication when raided and having no incentive to change 
their anti-competitive behaviour due to the already weaker competition conditions (Bredenkamp, 
2019:4); anti-competitive behaviour normally having lasting lingering effects and possibly being 
subject to a settlement negotiation period (Boswijk et al., 2019:26); sunk investments delaying the 
anti-competitive operations (Fagart & Boshoff, 2019); customers getting accustomed to the anti-
competitive conditions (this can be due to benefit programmes or lengthy corporate agreements or  
longer recovering market shares) (Comair Limited v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd [2017] 2 All 
SA 78 (GJ)); “structural effects of the infringement that may be difficult and lengthy to undo (existing 
contractual obligations, network effects, or other barriers to the re-entry of a foreclosed competitor)” 
and “compensation not only for the profits lost during the infringement period but also for the profits 
foregone after its termination” (The Practical Guide Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages 
Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
2013:55); input price rises reflecting only months later in downstream products (for example, if 
Foskor raise the price of fertilisers, although their customers pay the higher price at that moment this 
may reflect in food prices only later); and the list goes on. To make the problem even more clear, 




email is not necessarily the exact date on which all the members involved raised their prices 
(Bredenkamp, 2019:4).  
 
When one analysing these factors as they come into play in different cases, it becomes evident that 
in regard to the starting point, the effects of the conduct may lag behind the date formally identified 
by the authorities, and in regard to the identifying the end of the period when the conduct took place, 
its actual effects may end much later than the identified formal date of closure. Anti-competitive 
behaviour might have lasting incommensurate effects or could become ineffective long before the 
members formally disband (Boswijk et al., 2019:26). 
 
It is clear that pre- and post- effects in any anti-competitive behaviour, including the abuse of 
dominance by asking an excessive price, is a real and robust possibility and one therefore needs to 
be aware of the possible difference between the traditional formal dates and the relevant effective 
dates. The next section of this paper will explain why the dating of these effects matters in excessive 
pricing cases. 
2.4 The importance of the dating of excessive pricing  
 
The dating of excessive pricing is vital not only to the proper calculation of the relevant damages, 
but also in detecting the conduct in the first place. From the previous section, it is clear that with 
regards to Covid-19-related cases, excessive pricing is detected by comparing prices in the pre-
disaster period with prices in the disaster period, which is the period under investigation. One is not 
only comparing the levels but also in periods. The determination of duration of the different 
competitive and anti-competitive periods and their placement may influence the detection of 
excessive pricing. The conduct of excessive pricing is more concerned with sustained behaviour as 
oppose to shorter fluctuations that normally occur in the market.9  In section 2.2 of this paper it was 
indicated that the use of econometric methods is necessary in certain cases. It is important to note, 
however, that the econometric method will not adequately control for demand and supply if one is 
not working with the appropriate period. 
 
 
9 When the period is sufficiently long, this will allow for clarity with regard to the distinction between acceptable cases 
“involving a temporary upshot in price, which subsequently returns to the benchmark level” and those cases where there 




Normally, an appropriate competitive period is calculated on a case-by-case basis (Boshoff, 
2020:10), but now the new regulations specify the particular time frame to use for the competitive 
benchmark: December 2019 to February 2020. This is odd, as the literature on this topic normally 
refrains from linking a benchmark to a specific time. To properly understand how prices respond to 
costs and demand, for example, would require a longer period. Features like seasonality can easily 
influence these relationships, especially over only a three-month period.10 It is also necessary to 
consider longer periods retrospectively to see how preceding quarters or months changed the price 
(past responses) (Boshoff, 2020:11). For example, costs almost never have an immediate effect on 
prices. Dynamic models may account better for this. Giving a fixed competitive period for all cases 
would not accurately reflect the competitive period in all those cases. The authorities have been open 
to the suggestion that they consider a longer period in some of the most recent excessive pricing 
cases.11 
 
In addition to it being necessary to consider a long enough period for a complete assessment, one 
also needs to choose a period with limited structural changes (Boshoff, 2020:10). Boshoff (2020:10) 
describes the period necessary for a benchmark as follows: 
A benchmark price is the average price over a competitive period of suitable duration, where such 
duration should reflect a balance between obtaining a thorough assessment of price setting and 
minimising the risk of structural or other factors contaminating the assessment.  
Clearly the period chosen in each of the cases has a significant role in detecting excessive pricing. 
For example, if a firm had increased its prices in a sustainable fashion (over the three-month time 
frame) before the declaration of a state of disaster, comparing the averages over the two periods 
would not reflect an increased margin and would not show excessive pricing. Although it is not likely 
that the above scenario would have been anticipated by the firm, the use of a longer period as the 
competitive period might have reflected a more accurate estimation of its behaviour. Taking an 
average over a longer time period may account for uncertainties and existing demand and cost factors 
in the short period before March. Boshoff (2020:11) supports this argument in suggesting that it may 
be necessary to consider data even further back than the regulation-defined period, especially when 




10 Normally higher demand around December and seasonal price discounts in January and February are followed by 
increases in demand that are not necessarily related to excessive pricing. 
11 Boshoff suggested rather using a comparative period that ends once there are observed “changes in competitive 





It is important to note that the appropriate length of the chosen period depends on the data available 
and the frequency of price data. For example, data reflecting a lower frequency will need a longer 
period, but even higher-frequency data may need a longer pre-disaster period, especially when 
“historically subdued demand and cost increases, seasonal fluctuations or other idiosyncratic price 
behaviour (including special discounts) characterise the market” (Boshoff, 2020:11). 
 
The duration of the period is also important for calculating damages.12 In cartel cases, for example, 
the estimated overcharge is multiplied by each time period when it was charged (Connor, 2014:252). 
Damages accrue over the period and the accuracy of its calculation therefore also depends on 
properly understanding the duration involved (Davis & Garcés, 2010:376). The placement of the 
period would also determine the different volumes purchased and many other factors that may 
influence the amount of the damages (Boswijk et al., 2019:26). The dating of excessive pricing 
determines the exact period involved, which needs to represent the actual damages suffered. It is 
clear from the above that getting the appropriate dates of excessive pricing is important for detecting 
the conduct in the first place and then for calculating the damages caused. 
 
 
3. Current policy approaches to determining the anti-competitive dates 
 
Competition policy recognises that there may be a difference between formal liability dates and the 
effective dates of anti-competitive conduct. The first part of this section of the paper will analyse 
Boswijk et al. (2019), which draws extensively from The Practical Guide Quantifying Harm in 
Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (2013) to guide the determination of cartel dates. The second part of this section 
will study abuse cases other than those based on excessive pricing, where the dating of anti-
competitive effects was disputed. Lastly, this section will focus on excessive pricing cases where it 
will show how econometric methods may be helpful in determining appropriate dates. It will show 
that although dating is important for the more recent Covid-19 excessive pricing cases, it is also 
imperative for imminent damage claims. 
 
 




3.1 European guidance of determining cartel dates 
 
The collusion literature provides a novel framework to learn from with respect to dating anti-
competitive effects. Traditionally, formal dates founded on the basis of documentary evidence were 
used as the start and end dates of cartels (Boswijk et al. 2019). Dussart-Lefret (2019), head of unit 
in the DG Comp established this position by stating that the start and end dates of a cartel are 
identified by the earliest date or latest date respectively for which there is a proof of cartel conduct, 
where such proof is found in documentary evidence such as minutes of meetings or phone calls, the 
exchange of emails or letters. Some policy instruments recognise some features relating to this issue 
of dating. The Practical Guide Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of 
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2013:18) states the 
following:  
Some infringements start, or cease, gradually: and often doubt exists regarding the exact beginning of 
an infringement and, in particular, the effects it produces. Indeed, decisions of competition authorities 
regularly mention evidence suggesting that the infringement may have started earlier than the period 
established as the infringement period for the purposes of the decision. It is possible that a competition 
authority limits the finding of an infringement to a certain period, while in fact the infringement may 
have had a longer duration. Econometric analysis of observed data can be a way to identify when the 
infringement's effects started or ceased. 
Even with the recognition given above, this failed to provide clear guidance as to the use of 
econometric methods in this regard. Therefore, in notable European cartel cases (for example the 
Vitamin and Lysine cartel case) the traditional method of relying on formal dates was applied.13 The 
previous section of this paper has shown that these formal dates may differ from the actual effective 
dates. 
 
Boswijk et al. (2019) draw on the European policy guide to find more appropriate start and end dates. 
They show mathematically that misdating cartel effects in this regard will lead to “a (weak) 
overestimation of but-for prices and an underestimation of overcharges irrespective of the type and 
size of the misdating” (Boswijk et al. 2019)14. The but-for price here simply means the price that 
 
13 See Bredenkamp (2019) for a discussion of these cases (Appendix A). Interestingly, in the Vitamin-cartel case, the 
parties admitted to their own staring point. This is worrying in the context of this study, as parties then have the power to 
drag their own overcharge average down by admitting, for example, to an earlier starting date. 
14 To explain these consequences in more depth as done in previously conducted research (Bredenkamp, 2019), the 
following details are listed: “overcharges can either be defined as the difference between actual prices and but-for prices 
or instead of actual prices rather the difference between predicted prices and these but-for prices (Boswijk et al. 2019). 
The total damage effect depends on how overcharge is calculated: it can be based on either predicted or actual anti-
competitive prices, where the former proves to be unreliable when effect dates are unknown at first, which can lead to an 
over or under estimation (Boswijk et al., 2019). Actual prices, however, always show a (weak) underestimation (the 
resulting damage estimator is conservative) (Boswijk et al., 2019). While a longer alleged formal anti-competitive period 




would have prevailed had the conduct not occurred (Boshoff, 2015). The “but for” methodology will 
be discussed in section 4 of this paper.  The severe consequences of misdating found by Boswijk et 
al. (2019) support the claim that it is important to find appropriate anti-competitive dates. 
 
Focussing on the how to determine appropriate anti-competitive dates, Boswijk et al. (2019) use 
econometric methods to mark the actual effective dates in a particular case. They use the European 
Sodium Chlorate cartel as an example to corroborate his findings. There are different econometric 
methods that may assist authorities in this matter of dating. The specific econometric method used 
by Boswijk et al. (2019) will be explained extensively in the methodology section, together with 
other possibilities. In short, Boswijk et al. (2019) extended a known comparison technique namely 
the before-during-and-after technique “with an empirical cartel dating procedure, which infers 
structural breaks of unknown number.” The structural breaks identified in the data mark the 
corresponding dates where the effect was reflected in the market. 
 
3.2 Dating of abuse cases other than excessive pricing 
 
The dating of the anti-competitive effects caused by the abuse of dominance other than excessive 
pricing was primarily addressed in Comair Limited v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd [2017] 2 All 
SA 78 (GJ).15 South African Airways (SAA) violated Section 8d(i) of the Competition Act 89 of 
1998 (Republic of South Africa, 1998) as amended, which prohibits a firm from “requiring or 
inducing” an supplier/agent or customer not to deal with a competitor. The formal dates identified in 
this case were based on agreements made by SAA with travel agents,16 to pay them considerable 
sums to deal only with SAA at the expense of its competitors (Comair Limited v South African 
Airways (Pty) Ltd [2017]). 
 
If precedent had been followed, the formal dates identified would have prevailed. However, the 
economic experts involved considered different periods where the effects of the conduct may have 
 
the inaccurate time periods are pre-multiplied by negative or zero overcharges (Boswijk et al., 2019). Boswijk et al. (2019) 
suggest the solution of structural break tests which they apply to the Sodium Chlorate cartel, and the case study 
corroborates the above findings”.  
15 Note that all the information contained in the paragraphs that follow is obtained from Comair Limited v South African 
Airways (Pty) Ltd [2017] 2 All SA 78 (GJ) unless stipulated otherwise. For the sake of readability, this attribution will not 
be repeated after each and every sentence. 
16 Note that during the period of this conduct, one had to book a flight ticket through a travel agent. There were no easily 




been present in the domestic airline market. Specifically, the end of the damage effective period was 
in dispute and they considered the possibility of lingering effects lasting in the market even after the 
end point of the damages. 
 
Comair argued that although the existing agreements ended on 31 March 2005 (the formal end date 
stipulated by the Tribunal), the next “generation” of agreements was under draft17 and was expected 
to take effect thereafter. Judge Matojane ruled in favour of this argument as it was supported by 
evidence showing that despite the existing agreements ending, most agents rationally expected there 
to be another set of agreements rewarding them for only selling SAA tickets, and therefore continued 
this induced behaviour for an additional four-month period up until 31 July 2005. 
 
Following the establishment of an effective end point, the experts also disputed whether there were 
lingering effects lasting beyond this end point. Comair’s argument was that customers had become 
accustomed to flying with SAA during the long period of abuse and would therefore not simply 
switch to “new competitors” after the abuse period. Comair supported this argument with three 
reasons: firstly, SAA had active benefit programmes incentivising customers to stay loyal to them; 
secondly, lengthy corporate agreements were in place (lasting beyond the formal end date) that would 
not have existed had it not been for the conduct; and thirdly, Comair’s market share had not recovered 
overnight. Therefore, the court awarded another 12 months to account for these anti-competitive, 
lingering effects. 
 
Thus, in consideration of the effects the formal end period of 31 March 2005 was amended by adding 
an additional 16 months (a 4-month extended end date plus 12 months to account for lingering 
effects). This additional period amounted to a finding of R450 million of damages additional to the 
existing damages caused, proving the underestimation thereof. SAA appealed against this decision, 
but the matter was settled. It is of the opinion that this case will form a benchmark (precedent) for 
future cases, which are likely to take a more effects-based approach when estimating period related 
damages.   
 
When the authorities are faced with such challenging tasks, there is clearly a need for expert advice 
like the above, supported by economic analysis, in addition to traditional factual evidence, to assist 
 




them in their assessment. What follows naturally in this study is to use the data from the above case 
to test the experts’ findings and support the use of effective dates. However, Harman (2020), the 
expert on the case, confirmed that this is not possible and listed the reasons therefore. Despite the 
confidentiality issues, Harman listed additional reasons which give insight into the limitations of 
econometric applications and will be discussed. They were: “SAA’s market share and price data 
were not robust”;18 there was a shortage of data prior to the infringement; there were concerns as to 
whether “SAA continued to operate illegal commission structures” post infringement; “during the 
relevant periods, there were a number of airlines exiting the market, and the introduction of low cost 
carriers” which may have been partly responsible for reducing Comair’s market share; the 
transitioning “away from travel agents to online bookings”, the recession over the period19 and the 
“high inflation, oil price changes”, etc. had a significant impact on prices; various loyalty schemes 
were in operation but there was no evidence; no data to support SAA’s claim that its “demand 
increased due to government policy”; prices were influenced by other factors as well, such as the 
fact that “its planes flew more routes at higher frequency, and were less full, its pricing model was 
flawed”; pricing in airlines is a complex matter in general, being based on “complex pricing 
algorithms which monitor demand over time”; quality also changed overtime; SAA focussed more 
on the back of the plane, “whilst Comair focussed on the front of the plane”; the prices available 
“reflected a simple average of different ticket types, so it was difficult to understand if a change in 
price reflected a mix change”; the airlines changed their “frequent flyer and staff flying policies over 
time”; they changed their “fleet over time (more fuel efficient planes)”; et cetera. 
 
Thus, the application of econometrics to this case would not be possible due to there being 
insufficient data to model the demand and prices in the counterfactual scenario. Therefore, another 
case is chosen to do an empirical application of, and although it presents its own challenges, these 
are not as daunting as those in SAA. This study recognises the possible limitations and argues that 





18 According to Harman (2020) new data was being provided by SAA even during the trial, that fundamentally changed 
the estimate of damages. 




3.3 Dating of excessive pricing cases 
 
Two key South African cases caused significant debates around the standards of determining 
excessive pricing. These were Mittal Steel v Harmony Gold/Durban Roodepoort Deep 
70/CAC/Apr07 (the Mittal Steel case) and Sasol Chemical Industries v The Competition Commission 
48/CR/Aug10 (the Sasol case).  
 
Mittal, a state supported company, was a near monopolist in the steel market (Mittal Steel v Harmony 
Gold/Durban Roodepoort Deep 70/CAC/Apr07). A complaint of excessive pricing was filed against 
Mittal relating to its flat steel products, and its import pricing parity was proof that its prices were 
indeed excessive – the Tribunal found Mittal guilty (Theron, 2019). Mittal also prevented its 
customers from reselling locally and the Tribunal prohibited this contractual term (Mittal Steel v 
Harmony Gold/Durban Roodepoort Deep 70/CAC/Apr07). However, the Competition Appeal Court 
found the tribunal’s approach to be fundamentally flawed as it was based only on a structural point 
of view (involving only looking at Mittal’s market share) and sent the case back to the Tribunal 
(Theron, 2019). The matter was settled before the trial (Theron, 2019). 
 
In the Sasol case there was a lot of emphasis on Sasol’s history as a state supported firm (Sasol 
Chemical Industries v The Competition Commission 48/CR/Aug10). The prices of “purified 
propylene and polypropylene” were in question and the Tribunal found them to be excessive on the 
basis that the prices bore no “reasonable relation” to the products’ economic value, and applied 
behavioural remedies (Sasol Chemical Industries v The Competition Commission 48/CR/Aug10). 
Again, the Competition Appeal Court reversed this decision and a settlement followed. In both cases 
it is important to note that entry into these markets is not easily possible and having state support 
gives rise to lower costs – making it harder to determine excessive pricing (Theron, 2019). However, 
the issue of dating is less important in these cases (only cases before Covid-19). As explained in 
section 2.1, these cases used a cost-based benchmark because they lasted for many years with no 
clear break of a non-competition and competition period, and therefore a benchmark like an 
intertemporal benchmark requiring a break would be appropriate (Boshoff, 2020:7).  
 
Although the above cases provided the first examples of South Africa’s position on excessive pricing, 
more recent developments in the context of Covid-19 have come to light where the issue of dating is 




month period prior to March as a competitive benchmark. In the next paragraph cases dealing with 
conduct that happened just before March 2020 will be discussed. 
 
The first Covid-19-related case in South Africa was the Competition Commission v Babelegi 
Workwear Overall Manufacturers and Industrial Supplies CC CR003Apr20. Babelegi sold dust 
face-masks to customers from 31 Jan 2020 to 5 March 2020 (the complaint period) and effected 
“several price increases (before the actual increase in its supplier costs on 18 March 2020)” 
(Competition Tribunal, 2020).  The first issue before the court was whether Babelegi was indeed 
dominant. The court relied on the abnormal circumstances of Covid-19 and made the highly 
controversial decision that a small firm like Babelegi was indeed “temporally” dominant. As one can 
see, dominance may also depend on the specific periods in consideration, but this is not the focus of 
this study. Secondly, the commission had to show that Babelegi had abused its dominance through 
charging an excessive price. Following the Act, a competition price had to be determined against 
which to measure Babelegi’s current prices. The parties agreed that the pre-Covid price might be 
used as such a competitive price. Thus, when these prices were compared, the Competition Tribunal 
(2020) found a significant price increase that did not relate to cost increases which accordingly 
constituted excessive pricing. In other words, the prices charged “bear no reasonable relation to the 
prices charged and mark-ups prior the Complaint Period as the appropriate and sensible benchmark 
of what competitive prices and mark-ups would be under conditions of normal and effective 
competition” (Competition Tribunal, 2020). The Competition Commission phrased it as follows: 
Babelegi is taking advantage of increased demand by charging an excessive price (Competition 
Commission v Babelegi Workwear Overall Manufacturers and Industrial Supplies CC 
CR003Apr20). 20 
 
Regardless of the critique of the establishment of dominance in this case, the most significant critique 
for the purpose of this study is that discussed in section 2.4: a fixed short benchmark period may be 
subjected to many other factors disrupting its competitiveness. In fact, in the Babelegi case, a 
comparator period of less than 2 months was used (9 December 2019 to 31 January 2020). 
Nevertheless, it is also of the opinion that the pre-Covid period was not the appropriate competition 
period to compare with, as it did not present to similar demand and cost conditions, which is the 
usual requirement of an appropriate intertemporal benchmark (Sutherland, 2020). In the normal flow 
 
20 As noted before, an interesting dispute here was that the complaint period preceded the date of publication of the 
Consumer Protection Regulations (19 March 2020) and these regulations could therefore not be applied (Competition 




of a market, when supply is consistent and demand increases, a firm charging a price which tracks 
the demand is not in the wrong. A price response to increased demand cannot be an excessive price. 
Sutherland (2020) is of the opinion that a more appropriate competition price would fall within the 
Covid-19 period (a different period for the competition benchmark) to allow for similar conditions 
in the two poles of comparison and thus take the increased demand into account. Econometric 
methods are necessary to properly account for the changes in cost and demand, although the short 
time frames of the Covid-19 period would limit the amount of data available.  
 
Other opinions state that the court should have considered more than simply “accounting costs”: the 
firm suffered the fear of future cost increases and a possible disruption in supply (Sutherland, 2020). 
As a smaller firm, it was not necessarily unreasonable for it to respond with price increases. Many 
other similar firms behaved similarly, but the tribunal dismissed this consideration too easily, by 
stating that they all practised the same exploitation. Econometric methods may show differently: that 
the price increases reflect higher demand that was not necessarily balanced by an increase in supply.  
 
It is acknowledged that the tribunal was under pressure from the public and political forces in the 
Babelegi case, but this case created a chain effect and many other cases followed, based on a 
relatively system of determining excessive pricing (Sutherland, 2020). The authorities should be very 
careful in this regard. It is uncertain what type of benchmark would be used post Covid-19, but if the 
intertemporal benchmark prevails as the main excessive pricing determination method, the time 
frames of the different periods used to as poles of comparison are of concern. It is clear that the use 
of more sophisticated (econometric) methods is necessary to determine appropriate comparable 
periods, not only for these and similar Covid-19 cases, but also for future excessive pricing damage 
claims. 
 
The importance of the use of econometric methods in such competition cases is supported by the 
work of Rubinfeld (1985). Even in earlier years he found an increasing acceptance of econometric 
methods in the advisory system, which according to him “opened the door to law-related econometric 
studies, particularly in connection with the use of multiple regression models” (Rubinfeld, 
1985:1094). He acknowledged the necessity for this trend to continue and to evolve – exactly what 
this study is trying to achieve in a specific context. Rubinfeld (1985:1094) shows how valuable 
econometric techniques can be, especially in cases involving “complex, essentially empirical issues”, 




may be “subject to manipulation when applied in a courtroom setting.” He identified two problems 
as follows: 
The potential problems are of two distinct types. First is a tendency to interpret regression results as 
being more accurate than they are. Regression results may appear deceptively accurate because the 
underlying assumptions are seldom made explicit. A second problem is the experts' tendency to analyze 
data and report in a manner which biases the results for the particular side that they represent. This 
tendency could reflect an intent to mislead or deceive, but it need not. More likely, it reflects 
economists' standard practice of searching among alternative models, trying numerous functional forms 
and variables to find the ‘best fit,’ and reporting only the final outcome of the search process (Rubinfeld, 
1985:1095). 
Instead of giving rigid guidelines, his article intended to motivate researchers from both the legal 
and economic disciplines to develop econometric methods that would be “practical and suitable for 
a statistical litigation context.” The suggested solution is to consider the appointment of a “neutral” 
expert who is not acting for one side or the other, and motivating experts to provide all results and 
reasons, not just the “best fit” (Rubinfeld, 1985:1096). Following this advice, the author of this study 
attempts to adopt an unbiased approach to the case study that follows, and portrays all possible results 




To understand the econometrics necessary to assist authorities with the issue of dating, this section 
will analyse four subdivisions: the ‘but for’ methodology; structural break tests; regime-switching 
modelling; and finally the advantages and disadvantages of the multiple methods.  
 
4.1 The ‘but for’ methodology 
 
The ‘but for’ methodology will be analysed by using price regression models with a focus on the 
dummy-variable techniques (although some attention will also be given to the forecasting method) 
followed by an explanation of the traditional reliance on fixed dummies.  
 
As explained before, one of the more challenging difficulties with anti-competitive cases is not only 
the need to detect anti-competitive behaviour but also the need to estimate the appropriate damages 
that the conduct caused. In both collusive and excessive pricing cases, one essentially needs to 
calculate the “overcharge” or “excess price” asked by the anti-competitive firms/firm to determine 




charged in the period under scrutiny with the prices that would have prevailed had the conduct not 
occurred (this counterfactual price is called the “but-for” price) (Boshoff, 2015:222). Such a 
comparison should be cautious of other contributing factors. Boshoff, Bun, Schinkel and Van 
Jaarsveld (2019:2) put it as follows:  
A simple comparison, perhaps of the cartel price and pre-cartel price (as one example of a “but for” 
price) may run into serious challenges: demand and cost developments during the cartel period may 
also influence the price, apart from the decision to collude. The standard approach to estimating 
overcharge is therefore to develop a regression model in which price is determined by a range of 
relevant demand and cost drivers. 
Boshoff (2015:222) refers to this problem as the identification problem: the modeller must  be sure 
to isolate the effect of the anti-competitive action, for example a cartel, from these other effects 
caused by demand and cost conditions. The dominant method in practice of solving this problem and 
determining the but-for price is the comparative method, as mentioned in section 2.1 of this paper, 
where prices during the conduct period are compared with prices from a similar, comparable market 
which are not characterised by anti-competitive activity, or compared with the same market but for 
a different period when the market was competitive (Hüschelrath, 2013). The latter method, in which 
the same market is used but in different periods (the period under investigation is compared with a 
period “not characterised by the allegedly collusive conduct”) is called the temporal approach. It is 
nested within the comparative approach previously discussed, and is the most commonly used 
(Boshoff, 2015:222).  Temporal approaches in cartel literature relate strongly to intertemporal 
benchmarking, as discussed in excessive pricing cases. The temporal approach selects a period 
“either before or after the cartel” and uses this information to estimate the but-for prices involved 
during the cartel conduct period. In the same way, in excessive pricing cases the period under 
investigation is compared to the period before Covid-19. 
There are several possible methods to apply the temporal approach (Boshoff, 2015:222).  The 
simplest of these is the “before-and-after” method. The name is self-explanatory. Prices in the cartel 
period are simply compared with prices in non-cartel periods (Boshoff, 2015:222).  In cartel literature 
it is known that when the before-and-after method is used it is very difficult to link the anti-
competitive conduct solely to the change in price as one is not controlling for possible demand and 
supply shocks (White et al., 2006).  The literature tends to lean towards a multivariate price model 
to find coefficient estimates which can be applied to data in the anti-competitive period to predict 
but-for prices via forecasting or backcasting (Paha, 2010).  Unfortunately, the temporal approach is 
vulnerable to structural changes that occur over time (Boshoff, 2015:222). Again, one becomes 




manner requires sufficient data in both comparable periods, and this may lead to lengthy data usage 
over long time periods which are susceptible to structural changes. (It is likely that cost, demand, 
and price relationships will have changed.) 
As for the comparator benchmarking as discussed above, in cartel literature this idea is called the 
spatial approach. It is also embedded in the comparator-based approach (Boshoff, 2015:222).  In the 
same way, similar markets in different regions can provide information for determining but-for prices 
(Rubinfeld, 2012). The spatial approach can take many forms21 but one is still faced with the 
challenges of finding an appropriate comparator market and data constraints regarding controlling 
for cost and demand in every market. As already discussed, comparative benchmarking requires the 
same cost and demand conditions. The spatial approach also involves this assumption of similar 
demand and cost conditions, as discussed before. According to Boshoff (2015:224), this assumption 
is reasonable when there are comparator products available that are “closely related” to the product 
involved in the anti-competitive behaviour. If not, then econometric methods controlling for the 
demand and cost differences may be necessary. This study will use this approach in the next section, 
where the export prices of Foskor’s phosphoric acid will be used as a comparator to predict the local 
but-for price, therefore assuming that the export and domestic prices share similar demand and 
supply drivers.  
The econometric but-for methodology will now be explained through a standard price regression 
model similar to that used by Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld (2019:4).  
 
The different approaches described above may be adopted to estimate the following long-run 
relationship between the price of the relevant product or service and its drivers: 
 







where 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the price of the relevant product or service i at that time period t; 𝑑𝑡 is a dummy variable 
which allows for different periods by changing the intercept: the anti-competitive period that takes 
the value of 1 when abuse or collusion is present, and 0 if such anti-competitiveness is not present 
(0 if in the competitive period); price is lagged, which adds a dynamic element to account for possible 
serial correlation (information criteria will indicate the optimal lag length); 𝕩𝑡−𝑙 represents a vector 
 
21 Boshoff (2015:223) describes some of these forms as follows: “One such a spatial approach is the yardstick method, 
which involves a direct comparison of prices in different regions. A more appropriate spatial method, which also 
incorporates temporal features, is a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis. DID analysis involves a comparison of the 




of price drivers – which may include cost and demand drivers, or import and export prices depending 
on the approach used; where the error is normal: 𝜖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2). Intuitively, this is a normal regression 
where price is explained by its expected drivers. However, the dummy-variable approach adds this 
𝑑𝑡 (dummy variable). Thus, if this dummy variable equals zero (in the instances where no anti-
competitive behaviour is present) then this newly added term would disappear, and one would have 
a normal regression. But if this dummy variable equals 1 (during abuse/collusion) it would be 
multiplied by the parameter (𝛿) and the whole price regression would switch upwards or downwards 
with 𝛿 reflecting the higher or lower price respectively (Van Jaarsveld, 2019). Boswijk et al. 
(2019:28) describe it as follows: the dummy variable’s parameter “quantifies the cartel occurrence 
as a price shift”. To interpret a parameter economically, it would answer the question of how much 
the dependant variable changes when the independent variable changes. Thus, 𝛿 shows how much 
prices change when 𝑑𝑡 changes from 0 to 1, or vice versa. Therefore, the overcharge or excessive 
price is reflected by this parameter (𝛿) of the dummy variable (Van Jaarsveld, 2019). The statistical 
significance of this parameter (𝛿) is very important when calculating overcharge/excessive pricing, 
as it is the answer of how much of overcharge exists (Van Jaarsveld, 2019).  The 𝛿 parameter is then 
used further to calculate overall damages (Van Jaarsveld, 2019). Looking at the parameter once 
would simply mean the overcharge of one product or service at one point of time; it does not reflect 
all the damages. The following formula may be used to calculate all the relative damages: 
 





Basically, the overcharge parameter (when present) is multiplied by the “quantity sold” (Van 
Jaarsveld, 2019). Or in other words the estimated overcharge is multiplied by each time period it was 
charged for each quantity being charged for (Connor, 2014:252). The no-collusion or no-abuse 
period will not be summed over. 
 
The reason why dating is such a crucial aspect here is because the above parameter (𝛿) estimated by 
the regression is a sort a of “average” estimation. The regression estimates the average overcharge 
or excessive price throughout the whole abuse/collusion period (Van Jaarsveld, 2019). The 
overcharge parameter is a fixed amount through all the abuse/collusion time period, and not dynamic. 
This per se is not problematic, but if the dates or periods of competition and anti-competition are 
wrong (the dummy is placed at the wrong point in time) it could underestimate the damages caused, 







Figure 1: Outcomes of misdating anti-competitive effects 
 
Source: (Van Jaarsveld, 2019) 
 
Figure 1 considers the first of the two likely cases as identified in the literature.22 First, if a formal 
date earlier than the actual effective date is used (February), it includes lower competitive prices 
(from February up until 18 March) in this collusion/abuse sample over which the average is taken – 
dragging the average overcharge down. If only the prices over the effective dates were used (18 
 
22 Section 2.4. 
This smaller part of the sample 
following the effective dates 
will have a higher average 
The grey block’s average 





March up until 10 April) it would show a much higher average overcharge. This is dependent on a 
case-by-case basis and the product can go either way. 
 
The same logic follows for the second likely scenario, which occurs at the end. If a formal end date 
earlier than the actual effective end date is used, one essentially misses out on the remaining higher 
overcharges/excessive prices not included in the sample, also dragging the overcharge down. This 
intuition is exactly what Boswijk et al. (2019) proves mathematically, as described in the literature 
review. He shows that it normally leads to an underestimation of damages. Therefore, instead of the 
dates of the different periods being determined outside the model as in the traditional practice, it 
might be advantageous to supplement this fixed dummy with tests that identify the effective dates, 
as is done in the next section. 
 
Lastly it is important to note what type of regression and model specifications would be deemed 
most appropriate. The Overcharge literature explains using the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
estimation for the above model in (1). OLS assumes the exogeneity of the independent variables, but 
in this case OLS may lead to inconsistent results, as the variables might be correlated with the error 
term (Du Rand, 2020). The problem with OLS is that it assumes a standard relationship without any 
structural changes (like anti-competitive behaviour) in relationships between a price and its cost and 
demand drivers (the 𝜓 parameter) (Boshoff & Van Jaarsveld, 2019:5). In most cases where anti-
competitive behaviour was present, the variables will not be constant (non-stationarity will most 
likely be present) (Du Rand, 2020).  Auto-regressive distributed lag models (ARDL) may then 
perform better in this case. ARDL can accommodate non-stationary variables and a mixture of 
stationary and non-stationary variables (Shrestha & Bhatta, 2018:79). Time series data (especially 
pricing data) are likely to have “some kind of relationship with [their] previous values” and 
controlling for such previous values (together with an adjustment factor) in the independent and 
dependant variables may be worthwhile (Shrestha & Bhatta, 2018:72). Section 5 of this paper will 
test different numbers of lagging variables based on information criteria tests and the significance of 
the lags.  
 
As opposed to the dummy variable approach, one may also use forecasting to determine the but-for 
price with the estimates provided by (1), where data outside of the anti-competitive period are used 
to estimate the but-for price, provided that there are efficient data available pre and post the anti-




from similar markets/countries during the anti-competitive period and use such a fitted equation to 
forecast the relevant local but-for price needed to get overcharge (Boshoff, 2015:10). However, this 
method is also subject to hefty critiques, especially when trends are present. The focus of this study 
is on the dummy variable approach described above, where price data from the anti-competitive 
periods are also used. 
 
4.2 Structural break tests 
 
To address the issue of determining appropriate dates, Boswijk et al. (2019:36) propose to 
supplement the above before-during-after method with a multiple structural breakpoint test to capture 
the changes in price regression relationships due to the anti-competitive behaviour (Boswijk et al., 
2019:36). Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld (2019:359) describe the test as follows: 
…an unexpected change in a time-series variable that can change the mean or parameters of the 
underlying statistical process generating the data. Structural break dates may signal the start or end of 
a collusive agreement (Boshoff et al., 2018:359). 
In an excessive pricing case, for example, a structural change occurs when prices are raised but the 
drivers remain constant, as explained in the second section of this paper. This links the price increase 
directly to the change in competition behaviour, implying a causal effect. Such a structural change 
may be identified by a structural break test, endogenously identifying the place in time where anti-
competitive effects were present, and allows for more appropriate dummy placement. 
 
The first structural break test was developed by Gregory Chow in 1960: the so-called “Chow 
breakpoint test”, which is fitted for a single, exogenously known breakpoint in time23 (Chow, 1960). 
But the whole point of this study is that one does not necessarily know for certain where the break 
occurred and one wants to determine it endogenously. Andrews (1993) extended this Chow 
breakpoint test by allowing for the detection of a single unknown point in time where the break 
occurred (in other words, where the data generating process changed). The process is described as 
follows: this model is first estimated without the break, after which the sum of squared residuals 
(SSR) is stored; then the model is estimated for each “possible date of the break” (but 15% of the 
 
23 Intuitively, if one has a sample of 𝑇 time periods and one knows a break in the data generating process occurred at some 
point in time (𝑡𝑚), the Chow test will first estimate (1) with all the data, and then store the sum of squared residuals 
(𝑆𝑆𝑅0), then it will estimate the model (1) with only the data up to the break point 𝑡𝑚: thus  𝑡 = [1, 𝑡𝑚], and again store 
the sum of squared residuals (𝑆𝑆𝑅1), and finally it will estimate the model in (1) by using only the data after the break 
point in time 𝑡𝑚: thus t = [𝑡𝑚+1, 𝑡T] and store the residuals as (𝑆𝑆𝑅2) (Du Rand, 2020). These saved residuals can then 




first and last points in time are excluded to allow for the trimming parameter), whereafter each of 
these unique residuals is stored. The model with the lowest SSR is deemed most significant, and will 
indicate the related point in time if applicable (Du Rand, 2020). This test is limited to one break in 
time. It may be the case that anti-competitive behaviour started (one break) and stopped (another 
break) within the available sample, or even switched between regimes in the middle. The next 
paragraph will explain the test for multiple structural breaks and the section after that considers 
regime switching. 
 
Based on very much the same logic as that described above, the generally accepted test for multiple 
structural breaks is that proposed by Bai and Perron (1998). Boswijk et al. (2019:36) confirm the 
above reasoning by explaining that the Bai and Perron test also seeks to identify the points in time 
that best fit the relevant regression by “trying many different divisions of the time-series, each with 
different candidate dates to switch the dummy variables.” Borrowed from the author’s previous 
research,24 the following paragraphs explains this test methodology in depth. 
 
The original Bai and Perron (1998) paper explains how the test works. The following is a summary 
of their methodology25, which can be seen as consisting of two parts. The first part entails identifying 
the number of breaks in the series, irrespective of their statistical significance. Then the significance 
of each break can be tested, through a series of statistical operations making use of asymptotic values. 
When dealing with smaller series the methodology can yield significant size and power deviations. 
The second part emphasises a finite-sample complication when significance is tested for a set of 
breaks. Normally the F-ratio is used, which compares the SSR associated with the restricted model 
with the SSR associated with the unrestricted model. It is important to note that these breaks are 
found via a global minimisation process, and therefore there may be instances when a “set of t 
breaks” is not necessarily a “subset of t +1 breaks” (Bai & Perron, 1998). If this is the case, then the 
hypothesis of t +1 breaks is not nesting in the hypothesis of only t breaks, and the “1 / t t SSR SSR + 
ratio does not have the property of asymptotic convergence to the F-distribution” (Bai & Perron, 
1998) The “asymptotic distribution depends on sample-specific parameters”, for example on the size 
of the break (Bai & Perron, 1998). Bai and Perron (1998) propose always testing for the “presence 
of one break versus 0 breaks in the segments between breaks” to avoid this problem. One should be 
careful, however, especially when one deals with smaller time series, as they involve even smaller 
 
24 Bredenkamp. A.C. 2019. Dating of anti-competitive effects in South African competition policy. 
25 The following paragraphs are heavily drawn from Bai and Perron (1998). Their source will not be cited after each 




segments and only a few observations determine the result. The Bai-Perron test can accommodate 
features like autocorrelation26 and heteroscedasticity, which is a vital capacity, as these statistics use 
asymptotic critical values (provided in tables at the main confidence levels) to conduct a Wiener 
process.27 Bai and Perron propose that a bigger segment size relative to the sample should be used 
when one is faced with a smaller data series. 
 












where j =1,…,m+1, where m constitutes the number of structural breaks, 𝑝𝑖𝑡   is the observed price 
(the dependent variable as described above), 𝕩𝑡−𝑙   and z t are the vectors of covariates, 𝜓 and δj are 
the corresponding coefficients (vectors), and 𝜖𝑡 is the disturbance term. The regression coefficients 
can be jointly estimated through the middle terms (∑ 𝛼𝑝𝑡−𝑙
𝑚
𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝜓𝕩𝑡−𝑙
𝑛
𝑙=0 ), while structural 
changes are captured through the first term. This equation also shows a “partial structural model” 
since the parameter 𝜓 is not “subject to shifts and is estimated using the entire sample” (Bai & Perron, 
1998). If the middle terms were dropped then it would be “a pure structural change model, where all 
coefficients are subject to change” (Bai & Perron, 1998). The 𝜖𝑡 can be non-independent and 
identically distributed under the null hypothesis.  
 
Bai and Perron (1998) explain two possible ways to approach breaks. The first is called the global 
minimisation approach, where each break date (partition m) is identified as one which minimises the 
SSR (the sum of the squared residuals). This approach is advantageous as it identifies only the biggest 
breaks (the largest fall in SSR), or at least asymptotically. The cost, however, may be that not all the 
“biggest n breaks” may be included in the “biggest n + 1 breaks”. Another approach is to find the 
breaks sequentially by starting with one that minimises the SSR, followed by getting the single break 
which minimises the SSR for each “resulting partition’. Of the two, the second break will be that 
with the minimum SSR regardless of the significance, as these significance tests can be done 
separately. The hypothesis will depend on whether the number of dates is known - for example, the 
null hypothesis of no breaks versus the alternative of a known number of breaks - but this number is 
 
26  The Bai-Perron test deals with “autocorrelation in a non-parametric fashion” and proposes to “correct the time series 
residuals either through a Newey-West procedure or by including the lag of the time series as one of the regressors in the 
projection model” (Antoshin, Berg & Souto, 2008). 
27 It is suggested, however, that such corrections must be made only when “there is a strong prior that the correction is 




not usually known. One can detect the “number of breaks” by estimating a sequence of supremum F 
statistics: first testing for a single break and then for l +1 via the F(l +| l) ratio and ending the process 
where the null hypothesis is not rejected. One should be aware that this test may “incorrectly estimate 
the number of significant breaks”, especially in situations where there are up and down switching 
regimes and a lot of breaks, but according to Bai and Perron (1998) this problem may be reduced by 
using the “Dmax” statistic. 
4.3 Regime-switching modelling 
 
Another problematic aspect often ignored in standard models is that it does not account for the pace 
and duration of transition periods between competitive and non-competitive periods (Boshoff & Van 
Jaarsveld, 2019:5). A Markov-Switching model may pose a solution to many of the insufficiencies 

























This model is written consistently with the notation in this study as described above, where 𝑆𝑡 
represents the operational regime at time period t, but this time without any a priori assumptions:  
𝑆𝑡 will be treated as model-determined instead of determining it exogenously as in the standard 
model (Boshoff & Van Jaarsveld, 2019:5). Thus, two separate data-generating processes for the 
different regimes will run, based solely on “an assessment of the probability of being in a particular 
regime” (Boshoff & Van Jaarsveld, 2019:5). The changes in the regime will be reflected in the 
intercept, and we are therefore assuming that such changes are reflected in price level shifts, although 
the specification of the model can also allow for the other parameters in the model to be regime 
dependent (Boshoff & Van Jaarsveld, 2019:6). We furthermore assume that the probability law used 
to determine 𝑆𝑡 follows a two-regime, first-order, Markov-chain following the constant transition 
matrix as described below (Boshoff & Van Jaarsveld, 2019:6): 
 
𝜉 =  [
𝜉(𝑆𝑡 = 1|𝑆𝑡−1 = 1) 𝜉(𝑆𝑡 = 2|𝑆𝑡−1 = 1)
𝜉(𝑆𝑡 = 1|𝑆𝑡−1 = 2) 𝜉(𝑆𝑡 = 2|𝑆𝑡−1 = 2)




where 𝜉(𝑆𝑡 = 𝑗|𝑆𝑡−1 = 𝑖) = 𝜉𝑖𝑗 describes the possibility of switching from any regime i at the 




probability law assumption here is valid in a unit root process (having strong persistence) (Boshoff 
& Van Jaarsveld, 2019:6). This is indeed the case for Foskor’s price data on phosphoric acid.  
 
This methodology is based on the work of Hamilton (1989) and Kim (1994), where they present a 
recursive, likelihood-based approach to get estimations for the filtered probability of a model being 
in a particular regime, where this probability is described as follows (Boshoff & Van Jaarsveld, 
2019:6): 
 
𝜉(𝑆𝑡 = 𝑖|Ω𝑇; 𝜃) (6) 
Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld (2019:5) used this probability estimation to date the relevant regimes 
accordingly, and to measure what they called “cartel effectiveness”, which reflects the speed of 
transitioning between the different regimes (Boshoff & Van Jaarsveld, 2019:6). What then follows 
is to estimate overcharge according to the identified anti-competitive periods by replacing the 
standard model’s unique intercept (because of the presence of collusion: 𝑑𝑡 = 1) by the estimated 
probability as follows (Boshoff & Van Jaarsveld, 2019:6): 
 









where 𝛽 provides the overcharge percentage and 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 equal to the probability in (5), shows the cartel 
effectiveness estimate providing an objective identification of the precise dates of the applicable 
regimes while accounting for the speed and lengths of transiting between them (Boshoff & Van 
Jaarsveld, 2019:6). 
 
When it comes to regime-switching models - as another possible method to assist in dating anti-
competitive effects - many types of specification choices must be made. This specifically includes 
the decision on which variables should be regime switching. According to Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld 
(2018) this is the first step in a Markov regime-switching model: “decide which parameters should 
be regime-dependent”. When one follows the standard approach in the literature, only the intercept 
is varied by regimes, as shown in (4) (Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld, 2018). This is essentially then the 
same concept as that used in (1) (the dummy-variable method) as the dummy for overcharge is simply 
an additional intercept (Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld, 2018). However, as mentioned above, the 
Markov regime-switching model allows for the other parameters and the covariance matrix to switch 
as well.  Many macroeconomists have used this Markov switching regime models in the same way. 




by looking at price responses to demand shocks. Thus, in their context it was relevant for both the 
intercept and parameters to differ across the regimes (Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld, 2018). 
An application to Foskor’s excessive pricing case is implemented and all the different switching 
decisions are reported in section 5.4. 
 
4.4 Multiple methods 
 
There is some resemblance between the structural break and the Markov-switching models, and both 
may be helpful in assisting competition authorities to detect and calculate anti-competitive effects 
by providing supportive evidence for the appropriate dates involved in a specific case. The structural 
break methodology as a supplement to the dummy variable approach may be imperative when 
determining specifically the start and end dates of anti-competitive effects, without focussing on the 
transitions (Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld, 2019:7).  Breakpoint tests merely shift from one regime to 
the other “as sudden deterministic events” (Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld, 2019:7).  The regime-
switching methodology, on the other hand, may also assist in understanding the effectiveness of anti-
competitive behaviour during the transition periods between regimes, and is more fitting than 
breakpoint tests in markets facing recurrent anti-competitive behaviour with multiple episodes 
(Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld, 2019:7). It is important to consider the results of both the structural tests 
and the regime-switching models when determining the dating of anti-competitive effects, as both 
may provide supporting evidence in the relevant context. 
 
Although advantageous, it is clear that such econometric methods are not a silver bullet applicable 
to every case in the same way, but may be of significance to authorities in appropriate cases, 
especially when dealing with highly complex matters. Even so, the above methodologies are also 
subject to limitations. The biggest limitation of the breakpoint tests is that it is likely to miss shorter 
intervals of regime changes (Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld, 2019:7). The Bai–Perron test, as said 
before, requires the specification of a “trimming parameter”. This parameter determines the 
“minimum distance” between the structural breaks available for identification (Boshoff and Van 
Jaarsveld, 2019:7). Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld (2019:7) explain that the problem occurs when there 
are not enough data. If the sample size is not “sufficiently large, a trimming parameter as small as 
5% of the total sample size can lead to imprecise test results.” Thus, when multiple breakpoints are 
closer to each other than the specified trimming parameter, then this test will fail to detect both points 




cases as they are characterised by short intervals. Using a mere fixed three-month period before a 
possible structural break detection might result in the test’s not detecting the breaks, and result in 
insufficient data to draw samples from. 
 
Regime switching models also face limitations where firms consider future conditions when deciding 
whether to engage in anti-competitive behaviour (Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld, 2019:8). Boshoff and 
Van Jaarsveld (2019:8) describe this in the context of a cartel and recognise that empirical models 
must then be estimated from future data. Their transition probabilities are, however, based on the 
“entire history of prices, demand, and cost factors” (Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld, 2019:8). They 
defend their approach as follows: 
these probabilities are merely the initial (or prior) probabilities, and they are updated each time period, 
using a Bayesian approach, to obtain the filtered probabilities at that time-point. Therefore, the 
probabilities reported in this paper gradually assign greater weight to present than past data.  
In the context of excessive pricing, one may also assume that firms would consider possible future 
demand and cost shocks before increasing prices excessively and facing the now high risk of 
prosecution. The data available in terms of these assessments will take time to be released and will 
be based on the past – however, as explained by Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld (2019:8), updated 
probabilities may gradually focus more and more on present conditions rather than on those in the 
past.28 
 
Nevertheless, using both the structural break and switching-regime methodologies could provide 
supporting evidence of when anti-competitive effects were truly present in the market. 
 
5. Case study 
 
In 2007 the Competition Commission of South Africa received an excessive pricing complaint 
against Foskor on their price of phosphoric acid (Competition Commission South Africa v Foskor 
(Pty) Ltd (43/CR/Aug10) [2011] ZACT 10). Foskor is the only local supplier of “phosphoric acid” 
in South Africa (Foskor (Pty) Ltd., 2020:3). Phosphoric acid is a liquid that has “agricultural, 
industrial, medical and retail” applications. The products made from it  include, amongst others:  
 
28 Boshoff and Van Jaarsveld (2019:8) explain this issue further: “These filtered probabilities are ‘smoothed’, using the 
Kim procedure, which involves weighting filtered probabilities at time t − 1 , t, and t + 1 to obtain smoothed probabilities 
for time t. In this sense, the probabilities reflect ‘local’ data. We acknowledge that this may underplay relevant data further 
into the future, under the assumption that firms could predict some of these data. Even so, this is not much different from 




catalysts, rust proofing materials, chemical reagents, latex, dental cements, tooth whiteners, toothpaste, 
disinfectants, food supplements, carbonated beverages, waxes, polishes and animal feeds (Foskor 
(Pty) Ltd., 2020). 
Phosphoric acid may be used directly as a fertiliser but is normally processed further into end-product 
fertilisers (sinne nomine, 2019:3). The case of excessive pricing against Foskor will be used as an 
example to show how econometric methods may assist authorities in determining the effective period 
involved. 
 
5.1 Foskor as a case study 
 
Pursuant to the excessive pricing complaint received by the Competition Commission in 2007, an 
investigation into Foskor’s pricing structures occurred. The Commission found that prior to 2008 
Foskor charged an excessive price to their domestic customers as the local price was based on an 
export price formula that included the cost of freight (a notional transport cost, insurance costs and 
interest charges) which is only relatable to the export market (sinne nomine, 2019:3). The reason 
Foskor included these costs was because their pricing system was based on an “international pricing 
method of pricing phosphoric acid” as a world commodity.29  Foskor admitted to this conduct, paid 
an administrative penalty, and agreed to charge from then on only the price based on the Free On 
Board Richard’s Bay Port, which removed the freight costs for local customers. The Free On Board 
Richard’s Bay (FOB) price is the international published price (the export price, also called the India 
price) less freight charges (Omnia Group Proprietary Limited t/a Omnia Fertilizer v Foskor 
Proprietary Limited (74266/17) [2019]).  The formal settlement agreement between Foskor and the 
Commission occurred on the 26 July 2010, which agreement subsequently became a Tribunal 
consent order on 28 February 2011 (sinne nomine, 2019:4).   It is well known that Foskor voluntarily 
complied after 1 August 2008 (sinne nomine, 2019:4). There exists therefore less ambiguity 
regarding the former abuse because such abuse is followed by a long price regulated period (6 years) 
and it is therefore expected that the effects of the abuse has worn out.  
 
More intuitively for this study, is what happened after Foskor had complied with the consent order 
for 6 years.  The consent order made no provision for changing market conditions, and the data 
 
29  This system was based on the “India CFA (free carrier) price, which comprised the India CFR (Cost and freight price) 
plus 30 day interest charges on US prime rates calculated on the India CFR price.” Thus, “local customers were charged 
FOB price at Richards Bay Port calculated on India CFR phosphoric acid less 25% discount on the freight and interest 
charges. The nominal transport and interest charges therefore accounted for 75% of the freight portion of the India CFR 




showed that the export prices benchmark that Foskor was obliged to charge fell below the production 
costs of phosphoric acid (sinne nomine, 2019:4). Foskor occurred significant losses in their local 
market by having to follow this strict pricing structure, and therefore breached the consent order after 
August 2014 by starting to charge a price based on a cost-plus pricing model that was higher than 
that based on the Free On Board Richard’s Bay Port benchmark (sinne nomine, 2019:4). This formal 
date of September 2014 was identified in Omnia Group Proprietary Limited t/a Omnia Fertilizer v 
Foskor Proprietary Limited (74266/17) [2019] based on sales agreements that showed a higher price 
than the published international price agreed upon. This constitutes a highly anticipated break and is 
picked up by both econometric methods in the next sections. The focus in this case is that the start 
and end dates of excessive pricing were determined exogenously by considering formal liability 
evidence. Although the regulation of Foskor’s price in this case is debatable, the objective is to show 
how formal dates that are determined qualitatively may be deceiving. 
 
Therefore, accepting that the data period started in a “competitive regime”, as Foskor asked the 
regulated FOB price after 2008, the first formal liability date follows, when it was shown on sales 
agreements that Foskor asked the FOB price up until August 2014. Therefore, September 2014 
constitutes the first formal starting date. The dummy therefore switches from 0 to 1 and stays 1 until 
the judgement was granted on 16 October 2015, obliging Foskor to return to the regulated price (the 
dummy turns to 0). It was only in March 2016 when Foskor lodged an appeal that suspended the 
2015 High Court order where Foskor was granted leave to appeal (the dummy changed to 1) up until 
November 2017 when the appeal was dismissed with costs – Foskor had to comply. The parties 
started a mediation process on the 23rd February 2018 to find a balance between them, whereafter 






















There are many reasons why the anti-competitive effects may differ from the periods shown in figure 
2. What is expected to happen in 2014 is worrying: the dates on the initial sale agreements were only 
the start of the price increases. The Foskor acid division increased prices gradually and only in 2016 
has the local price exceeded the production costs. It is possible to speculate with regard to the nature 
Foskor’s business, its market share, the size of the firm, its operations, its existing agreements, its 
pricing lags, its menu costs, its dismantling capacity, postponing its innovation, et cetera, but the idea 
here is not to speculate, but to determine these dates quantitively via econometric methods and to see 




Foskor is a more recent excessive pricing case, for which data is available, and is therefore chosen 
as the subject of a case study. Note that Foskor relates to behaviour prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, 
so that the subsequent regulations related to excessive pricing during the disaster period did not apply 




Following international practice, the study relies on a comparator benchmark approach =where the 
investigated price (the local price) is compared to the price charged in a similar market (export prices) 
charged by Foskor. The price data in this study are compiled from a combination of sources, 
including Foskor’s Integrated Reports (2011 - 2019), other phosphoric acid pricing data from 
Quantec Easydata and data from the Department of Mineral Resources. The data consists of the 
monthly pricing data (in Rand) of phosphoric acid. The sample used includes prices charged from 
January 2013 to November 2017, as the focus is on behaviour and the effects following the regulated 
period. 
 
Referring back to equation (1),  𝑝𝑖𝑡 here is the nominal price of phosphoric acid for the domestic 
market, measured in Rand per ton. As can be seen in Figure 3, the excessive local price was charged 
prior to 2008. FOB prices became relevant only after the initial excessive pricing case, as Foskor 
was obliged to charge FOB (thus the local price and the FOB price were the same) until the breach 
in 2014, when Foskor charged prices higher than the FOB price. 
 
Figure 3: Local prices 
 


































































































































































































































































The above dependant variable is regressed on Foskor’s nominal export prices as the independent 
variable 𝕩𝑡 in (1), measured in Rands per ton. Figure 4 shows the pricing data of this comparable 
market. Essentially, export prices are used to predict the domestic but-for price, had excessive pricing 
not occurred. In this case the but-for price is almost clearer, because the Tribunal explicitly obliged 
Foskor to charge the export price minus freight, constituting the benchmark to compare prices against 
formally. Whether one agrees with such rigid price regulation is highly contested but irrelevant for 
this paper.  Using the export price in this way implies making the reasonable assumption that export 
and local prices share the same demand and supply drivers. 
 
Figure 4: Export prices 
 
Source: Foskor Integrated Report: 2011 – 2019, Department of Mineral Resources, and Quantec EasyData30. 
 
Foskor primarily exports phosphoric acid to India (the main export market) and the export price 
worked with is the CRF (Cost and Freight) India price. The CRF India price less freight costs as 
explained above constitute the FOB price that Foskor was obliged to charge. The price data are likely 
to adjust quicker than the data on cost and demand drivers, and are therefore used.  
 
30 Copyright 2020 Quantec EasyData. Title: Export — H28092: Phosphoric acid and polyphosphoric acids — C0: World 





























































































































































































































































In terms of the data description, we do not reject the presence of a unit root within local prices, as 
expected and explained above. We do, however, reject the possibility for a unit root within the export 
prices at 1% significant level, which is also consistent with the expectation that there were no anti-
competitive conditions that changed in the export market.31 The rest of the descriptive statistics of 
the total dataset are reported in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 Local price Export price 
 Mean  7840.225  8224.172 
 Median  6972.617  7479.716 
 Maximum  17266.73  19193.71 
 Minimum  3372.211  3980.730 
 Std. Dev.  2975.209  3138.216 
 Skewness  1.067915  1.649557 
 Kurtosis  4.006341  6.040816 
   
 Jarque-Bera  27.64019  99.81476 
 Probability  0.000001  0.000000 
   
 Sum  932986.8  978676.5 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1.04E+09  1.16E+09 
 Observations  119  119 
Source: Foskor Integrated Report: 2011 – 2019, Department of Mineral Resources, and Quantec EasyData. 
5.3 Structural break results 
 
Following Rubinfeld’s (1985) advice on how to use econometrics in the courtroom, as discussed in 
section 3.3, this section refrains from reporting only the “best fit” results from the data, but reports 
the majority of the possible outcomes to support the consistency and robustness of the proposed tests 
in the light of recognising effective dates. However, some of the possible results must be sifted out, 
based on sound economic reasoning. It is expected that with the number of observations in the sample 
and the nature of the data (price data adjust quicker than cost and demand drivers, for example) 
 
31 Van Jaarsveld is currently doing work on what the impact of non-stationarity may be on estimating damages. He shows 
that this is of great concern when one is dealing with data which only a small part of the data entails anti-competitive 
behaviour. The data of Foskor consist out of roughly 55 -60% of anti-competitive behaviour, putting it out of the danger 
zones. Nevertheless, Van Jaarsveld propose doing cointegration tests to ensure that the results is not spurious. Such tests 
can be shown as it was conducted on the models in the results that follow. To summarise, it showed that with the traditional 
dummy variable model, no cointegration relationship exist as expected. Using formal dates leads to spurious damage 
results. The Markov – switching model on the other hand tested positive in the sense that a long-run relationship does 




autoregressive lags up until 6 places are considered. Table 3 shows all the results for the identified 
structural breaks, with those in bold representing those with the smallest information criteria. 
 





















6 -3.697741 -3.169554 -3.491558 0.98 Many insignificant  2014M02 




4 -3.718428 -3.331091 -3.567227 0.98 Many insignificant  2014M02 
3 -3.904973 -3.517636 -3.753773 0.98 More significant  2014M12,
2016M06,
2017M03 
2 -3.541003 -3.294515 -3.444784 0.97 Many insignificant 2014M02 
1 -3.558765 -3.382703 -3.490038 0.97 Constants 
insignificant 
2014M02 












6 -3.790611 -3.151149 -3.601955 0.98 Many insignificant 2015M09 
5 -3.411111 -2.988561 -3.246165 0.97 Many insignificant No 
breakpoint 
selected 
4 -3.471067 -3.118942 -3.333611 0.97 Many insignificant No 
breakpoint 
selected 
3 -3.627340 -3.204790 -3.462393 0.98 Some insignificant 2014M07 
2 -3.660601 -3.343689 -3.536892 0.97 Some lags 
insignificance 
2016M02 













Specification leads to singular matrix in at least one sub-sample 
2 -3.978744 -3.556194 -3.813797 0.98 Many insignificant 2014M04 
1 -3.955521 -3.673821 -3.845557 0.98 Slight 
insignificance 
2016M03 
0 -3.926197 -3.714922 -3.843724 0.98 Mostly significant 2013M11 
2016M04 
*Essentially the same model; Models in bold have the smallest information criteria. 
Source: Foskor Integrated Report: 2011 – 2019, Department of Mineral Resources, and Quantec EasyData combined in 
excel and regressed via Eviews. 
 
Even though many different specifications are used, there is some consistency between the identified 
breaks. The literature on this suggests that only the intercept should be allowed to switch, (this 
includes the first block in the table). Of those models (where only the intercept switches), the one in 
bold represents the best fit in terms of information criteria retrieved. Thus, the break dates of 




fit the context of Foskor quite intuitively: December 2014 is highly likely as Foskor started to deviate 
from the consent order only in August 2014, but it may have taken the months up until December to 
reach a point of abuse again, as prices were only gradually increased, for instance; June 2016 is 
recognised when Foskor lodged the appeal and the High Court order was suspended. We can assume 
that Foskor reverted to charging a higher price, as their objective was to get the price higher than 
production costs; and finally we can also justify the 2017 break as they might have abandoned their 
attempts, and the appeal was later dismissed. The difference between the formal dates and the 
effective structural break dates when using this model is summarised as follows: 
Formal date Effective structural break date Difference 
1 September 2014 December 2014 4 months 
March 2016 June 2016 4 months 
November 2017 March 2017 -9 months 
 
Clearly, there is a notable difference between the formal and effective dates in this model. However, 
if one decides not to use just one model, but to look at all the different results, then there is still some 
consistency. Most of the models recognise the 2014 and 2016 breaks. The above results are 
summarised from an overall viewpoint in table 4.   















1 6 1 1 2 2 5 
 
The structural breaks identified most frequently by different models are those of February 2014 and 



















When adopting this point of view, a break (February 2014) earlier than the formal break (September 
2014) is recognised, and it is of the opinion that this may be due to Foskor’s not starting to charge 
every single customer the higher price at any one point in time. There may be still customers paying 
the lower price, and because one is working with a weighted average, such average will start to 
change earlier (Boshoff, 2020).32 The 2016 break is the same as that identified in the model that was 
singled out above. 
 
These structural break tests are fairly easy to replicate and do not entail many 
decisions/specifications. One would want that the following section showing the regime-switching 
models to produce fairly similar results, but it is expected that the effects might follow a bit later or 
last a bit longer due to transitioning. 
 





5.4 Regime-switching results 
 
Keeping to the same mind-set about exploring all possibilities and not simply the best fit, table 5 
reports the possible regime-switching results. To compare them with the findings from structural 
breaks, the intercept is allowed to switch, as discussed above (which is essentially the dummy 
variable approach). These specific regime models also recognise the 2014 break, together with some 
transitioning. Some deviations recognise the changes in 2016 as well. 
 
Table 5: Regime switching models 
Model 
specifics  








































































































6, 5, 4, 
3, 2, 1 







6, 5, 4, 
3, 2, 1 




6, 5, 4, 
3, 2, 1 




6, 5, 4, 
3, 2, 1 



























6, 5, 4, 
3, 2, 1, 
0 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Source: Foskor Integrated Report: 2011 – 2019, Department of Mineral Resources, and Quantec EasyData combined in 
excel and regressed via Eviews. 
 
Once again, if one had to choose a model (based on the dictum in the literature that only the intercept 
should switch) the model in bold (three lags in the first set of models) would be preferred, based on 




only reaching the “anti-competitive” state in 2015. It thus corresponds to the structural dates found 
in the previous section (February 2014/ December 2014 dependant on which view is taken), with the 
expected difference of taking a bit longer to account for transitioning and it therefore also fits the 
economic context of the market. A comparison of these results with the formal breaks is shown in 
figure 5 where “Dummyd” represent the formal dates and “Prob_A0” the relevant model’s effective 
dates. The effective dates represent a period that started of gradually (not simply a straight line) and 
may likely represent the true effect in the market. In this model, the quick, formal transitioning from 
anti-competitive to a competitive state and back around 2016 did not influence the effect that was 
still present in the market. It is expected that such a short period of competitive prices is 
overshadowed by the underlying effect lingering over that period. 
 

















I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
local price Dummy d PROB_A0  
Source: Foskor Integrated Report: 2011 – 2019, Department of Mineral Resources, and Quantec EasyData combined in 
excel and regressed via Eviews. 
 
If one is of the opinion that this particular model should not be preferred, then the other specifications 
also provide intuitive results. The next section will show that irrespective of which one of these 
models is used, it still amounts to an underestimation of the damages when the formal liability dates 




the very last model (the blue one) yielded results, it is unlikely that a price model with no lags would 
yield significant results. These prices are non-stationary, and a dynamic model would be more 
appropriate, as will be seen in the next section. 
5.5 Damages results 
 
In the previous sections, although there are some possibilities for different results, the difference 
between formal and effective dates in all the possible models was clear. One would now want to 
know what the impact of the different dates is by comparing the damages under the formal identified 
period with the damages accrued under the effective period.  
As determined in the data, we know we are working with a non-stationary dependant variable and a 
stationary independent variable. To determine the damages, we cannot therefore use a simple OLS 
regression. As discussed above, an ARDL regression would be more appropriate. We therefore first 
estimate the damages by using the formal liability dates, to compare the outcome with that of using 
more effective dates. These prices will be logged to simplify interpretation and all the regressions 
are run with 2 lags to be able to compare them to one another. (This might have been any other 
number – the intuition remains.) 
Following the traditional method, running an ARDL regression with this dummy to determine 
overcharge yields an overcharge of 1.97%. The results are shown in Appendix A. All the regime-
switching models that retrieved results were used to estimate the damages respectively, and the 
results are summarised in table 6. (The outputs are available in Appendix A.) 
Table 6: Regime model damage estimations 



































All switch (except 
variances) 
-Not likely to 
represent true 
results without any 










Source: Foskor Integrated Report: 2011 – 2019, Department of Mineral Resources, and Quantec EasyData combined in 
excel and regressed via Eviews. 
 
It is apparent that although some models show a bigger difference than others, they all represent an 
underestimation of the damages when formal liability dates are used without second thought. It is 
important to note that these results may go both ways: in the case studied, it showed that there was 




of an effect than that which is included in the formal liability dates, then the effective damages would 
reveal an overestimation of damages and the differences above would be positive, as less damage 
occurred. It aims to identify the true effects, irrespective of whether they are positive or negative, 
dependent on the case-relevant data. Although there are complications, the regime-switching models 
still yielded intuitive results. 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper shows that anti-competitive effects are not necessarily captured by adopting the traditional 
approach of using formal documentary evidence to determine their presence in the market. Getting 
the period or dates of when these effects occur wrong has a significant implication for establishing 
excessive pricing and estimating the damages appropriately. After studying the different benchmarks 
against which excessive pricing is measured, current policy approaches and cases, this paper suggests 
that taking an econometric approach to the issue of dating may be beneficial in this regard. This 
involves supplementing the traditional but-for methodology with a structural break test and a Markov 
switching-regime test to properly determine the effective dates of the case at hand.  
 
After analysing the results emanating from the proposed solution, it is clear that although intuitive, 
such additional econometric methods are not to be used as silver bullets in all like cases. What has 
been learnt from this study is that one must first see if the formal dates differ from those of effect, 
and if so, control whether sound economic reasoning can explain this difference in the particular 
case. Then it may be advantageous to use different econometric tests to identify more effective dates, 
conditional on whether they fit sound reasoning in the context of the market. Using different tests 
may confirm the robustness of the effective dates. 
 
The author acknowledges that legal practitioners may find it impractical to adopt such an approach. 
Yet it may be worthwhile to create a type of threshold beyond which the approach should be adopted. 
For example, if the formal damages exceed X amount then it should be at least be thought desirable 
to study the effects, as this could have a significant impact in the market economy. New 
developments, however, like those produced by Adam Giles from the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) are leading in the direction of using machine learning economics to determine effects. 
Nevertheless, this paper shows that taking a more fully-fledged effects-based approach by using 











7. Appendix A: Damage estimation 
 
7.1. Damages under traditional fixed dummies: 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LNLOCAL_PRICE  
Method: ARDL    
Date: 09/25/20   Time: 17:57  
Sample: 2013M01 2017M11   
Included observations: 59   
Dependent lags: 2 (Fixed)   
Dynamic regressors (2 lags, fixed): LNEXPORT_PRICE                    
Fixed regressors: DUMMY_D C  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
     
     LNLOCAL_PRICE(-1) 1.022189 0.136197 7.505197 0.0000 
LNLOCAL_PRICE(-2) -0.126415 0.135235 -0.934780 0.3542 
LNEXPORT_PRICE 0.475538 0.138720 3.428028 0.0012 
LNEXPORT_PRICE(-1) -0.103358 0.203039 -0.509055 0.6129 
LNEXPORT_PRICE(-2) -0.265979 0.154792 -1.718303 0.0917 
DUMMY_D 0.019753 0.015688 1.259093 0.2136 
C -0.023758 0.337896 -0.070311 0.9442 
     
     R-squared 0.975434     Mean dependent var 9.040476 
Adjusted R-squared 0.972599     S.D. dependent var 0.255367 
S.E. of regression 0.042271     Akaike info criterion -3.378428 
Sum squared resid 0.092916     Schwarz criterion -3.131940 
Log likelihood 106.6636     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.282209 
F-statistic 344.1235     Durbin-Watson stat 2.001961 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     *Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model 
        selection.   
 
 
7.2 Damages under the intercept switching model with the highest probability likelihood: 
 
Dependent Variable: LNLOCAL_PRICE  
Method: ARDL    
Date: 09/25/20   Time: 17:47  
Sample: 2013M01 2017M11   
Included observations: 59   
Dependent lags: 2 (Fixed)   
Dynamic regressors (2 lags, fixed): LNEXPORT_PRICE           
Fixed regressors: PROB_A0 C  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
     
     LNLOCAL_PRICE(-1) 0.829083 0.129797 6.387516 0.0000 
LNLOCAL_PRICE(-2) -0.220680 0.121029 -1.823373 0.0740 
LNEXPORT_PRICE 0.414852 0.121927 3.402449 0.0013 
LNEXPORT_PRICE(-1) 0.019754 0.181218 0.109009 0.9136 
LNEXPORT_PRICE(-2) -0.183126 0.137614 -1.330727 0.1891 
PROB_A0 0.137484 0.033272 4.132132 0.0001 
C 1.183294 0.422696 2.799394 0.0072 
     
     R-squared 0.980943     Mean dependent var 9.040476 
Adjusted R-squared 0.978744     S.D. dependent var 0.255367 
S.E. of regression 0.037231     Akaike info criterion -3.632339 
Sum squared resid 0.072081     Schwarz criterion -3.385851 




F-statistic 446.0999     Durbin-Watson stat 1.994610 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
          
 
7.3 Damages under the rest of the switching models: 
 
Dependent Variable: LNLOCAL_PRICE  
Method: ARDL    
Date: 09/25/20   Time: 17:49  
Sample: 2013M01 2017M11   
Included observations: 59   
Dependent lags: 2 (Fixed)   
Dynamic regressors (2 lags, fixed): LNEXPORT_PRICE            
Fixed regressors: PROBA2 C   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
     
     LNLOCAL_PRICE(-1) 0.928256 0.135783 6.836319 0.0000 
LNLOCAL_PRICE(-2) -0.247889 0.139075 -1.782416 0.0805 
LNEXPORT_PRICE 0.469278 0.131494 3.568817 0.0008 
LNEXPORT_PRICE(-1) -0.008496 0.196570 -0.043223 0.9657 
LNEXPORT_PRICE(-2) -0.227944 0.148082 -1.539305 0.1298 
PROBA2 0.097238 0.036637 2.654059 0.0105 
C 0.734006 0.439001 1.671990 0.1005 
     
     R-squared 0.977705     Mean dependent var 9.040476 
Adjusted R-squared 0.975133     S.D. dependent var 0.255367 
S.E. of regression 0.040270     Akaike info criterion -3.475436 
Sum squared resid 0.084326     Schwarz criterion -3.228949 
Log likelihood 109.5254     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.379217 
F-statistic 380.0621     Durbin-Watson stat 2.038253 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     *Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model 
        selection.   
 
 
Dependent Variable: LNLOCAL_PRICE  
Method: ARDL    
Date: 09/25/20   Time: 17:50  
Sample: 2013M01 2017M11   
Included observations: 59   
Dependent lags: 2 (Fixed)   
Dynamic regressors (2 lags, fixed): LNEXPORT_PRICE             
Fixed regressors: PROBA3 C   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
     
     LNLOCAL_PRICE(-1) 0.964223 0.137178 7.029009 0.0000 
LNLOCAL_PRICE(-2) -0.210507 0.141079 -1.492120 0.1417 
LNEXPORT_PRICE 0.458855 0.134588 3.409337 0.0013 
LNEXPORT_PRICE(-1) -0.029521 0.201111 -0.146791 0.8839 
LNEXPORT_PRICE(-2) -0.243959 0.151424 -1.611093 0.1132 
PROBA3 0.069698 0.033634 2.072252 0.0432 
C 0.515741 0.430716 1.197402 0.2366 
     
     R-squared 0.976616     Mean dependent var 9.040476 
Adjusted R-squared 0.973918     S.D. dependent var 0.255367 
S.E. of regression 0.041242     Akaike info criterion -3.427745 
Sum squared resid 0.088445     Schwarz criterion -3.181257 
Log likelihood 108.1185     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.331526 
F-statistic 361.9582     Durbin-Watson stat 2.024992 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     




        selection.   
 
 
Dependent Variable: LNLOCAL_PRICE  
Method: ARDL    
Date: 09/25/20   Time: 17:51  
Sample: 2013M01 2017M11   
Included observations: 59   
Dependent lags: 2 (Fixed)   
Dynamic regressors (2 lags, fixed): LNEXPORT_PRICE              
Fixed regressors: PROBA4 C   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
     
     LNLOCAL_PRICE(-1) 0.877386 0.134083 6.543595 0.0000 
LNLOCAL_PRICE(-2) -0.212136 0.127494 -1.663881 0.1022 
LNEXPORT_PRICE 0.722500 0.150037 4.815462 0.0000 
LNEXPORT_PRICE(-1) 0.000562 0.189604 0.002964 0.9976 
LNEXPORT_PRICE(-2) -0.269464 0.141453 -1.904973 0.0623 
PROBA4 0.086025 0.025829 3.330615 0.0016 
C -1.092246 0.438043 -2.493470 0.0159 
     
     R-squared 0.979136     Mean dependent var 9.040476 
Adjusted R-squared 0.976728     S.D. dependent var 0.255367 
S.E. of regression 0.038956     Akaike info criterion -3.541762 
Sum squared resid 0.078915     Schwarz criterion -3.295275 
Log likelihood 111.4820     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.445544 
F-statistic 406.7193     Durbin-Watson stat 2.052598 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     *Note: p-values and any subsequent tests do not account for model 
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